GROCERIES FOR VOTES: THE ELECTORAL RETURNS OF VOTE BUYING (Short title: GROCERIES FOR VOTES)

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Abstract

Despite the prevalence of vote buying in many developing democracies, the evidence of its persuasive effects is very limited. This paper proposes a way to evaluate the electoral impact of vote buying by using data from the 2012 presidential election in Mexico, where one of the parties distributed gift cards in exchange for support on Election Day. I evaluate the effect on citizens' electoral behavior by considering voters' proximity to the closest store where they could redeem the cards. The empirical analysis provides evidence of a persuasive effect of the gift cards, whose magnitude was positively related to precincts' proximity to the store. The analysis also shows the local scope of this vote-buying incident on the electoral outcome, whose effect was focused on a defined group of voters. This study expands on recent theoretical accounts of parties' targeting strategies and addresses some potential limitations in measuring the electoral consequences of vote buying.

Keywords: vote buying, persuasion, Mexico, voting behavior

Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Replication materials are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (https: //dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop) and at: http://bit.ly/VoteBuying2012.

1 Introduction

The notion that politicians distribute material rewards to shape voters' behavior is widespread among scholars and political observers. Previous work has focused on the strategies by which parties offer individual goods to maximize their electoral returns (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016). At the heart of this literature lies the debate on whether politicians use handouts to mobilize supporters or persuade swing voters. The first alternative assumes that handouts are distributed among voters more likely to maintain an ongoing interaction with the party. Multiple studies document this strategy, detailing the way in which party agents disproportionately allocate material goods among their core supporters (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Stokes et al., 2013; Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2014) and how handouts succeed in getting voters to the polls (Nichter, 2008; Szwarcberg, 2015; Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin, 2016; Bowles, Larreguy and Liu, 2017).

In contrast, the extent to which vote buying alters voters' ballot preferences remains open to question, even though this is a common assumption in the literature of redistributive politics.¹ In fact, recent works show that instances in which voters receive goods before the election but then renege on their promise at the polling station are not uncommon (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Vicente, 2014; Schneider, 2014; Greene, 2016). These and other studies suggest that parties' limited capacity to prevent opportunism curbs the efficiency of vote buying as a tool of persuasion.

The limited evidence on the effectiveness of vote buying may suggest that politicians around the world often engage in a practice doomed to fail. After all, examples from Mexico (Cornelius, 2003), Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman, 2007), Lebanon (Corstange, 2012), India (Chauchard, 2016), Uganda (Larreguy et al., 2017), and Turkey (Greene, Aytaç and

¹ This paper defines vote buying as the discretional, individual, and *quid pro-quo* provision of rewards to voters (Nichter, 2014, p. 316; Stokes et al., 2013, ch. 1).

Çarkoğlu, 2017) show that parties often allocate goods among individuals who later renege on their commitment. But the fact that politicians keep engaging in vote buying suggests that they obtain benefits that are not noticed by outside observed in most instances. If such is the case, then it is necessary to point out the conditions in which we can effectively observe the returns of vote buying.

This paper conjectures that the documented null returns of vote buying stem from two empirical obstacles. First, when more than one party engages in this practice, the shifts in voters' preferences are canceled out in the aggregate. In other words, the vote-buying of multiple parties produces a zero-net combined effect, in which the vote swings of any side are often neutralized by the efforts of its counterparts. Second, voters' valuations of the handout are not uniform, and their responses on the ballot depend on what is involved in the transaction. Parties employ different vote-buying methods depending on voters' opportunism and idiosyncratic characteristics. When the effects of clientelistic practices are aggregated, the variety of methods and targeted groups wash away, limiting our understanding for the returns of each tool.

Acknowledging both issues, I present evidence of a vote-buying occurrence during the 2012 presidential election in Mexico, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) distributed gift cards from one of the country's largest supermarket chains to voters in Mexico City and the State of Mexico. The novelty of this vote-buying method gave the PRI a temporary efficiency advantage over its rivals, enabling us to observe the electoral impact of the gift cards. Building on the existent theoretical work on redistributive politics, I estimate the vote swings in groups more likely to respond to vote buying but that differ in their geographic proximity to the stores where the gift cards could be used. Since voters' distance to the closest store affects the net valuation of using the cards, I examine candidates' vote shares and turnout rates across precincts at different distances from the supermarkets.

The findings suggest that the gift cards had a persuasive effect in favor of the PRI and that the magnitude of this effect was positively correlated with the precincts' proximity to the store. In particular, within the strongholds of the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), proximity to the stores had a positive relationship with the vote share of the PRI's candidate and a negative relationship with the vote share of the PRD's candidate. This relationship holds under multiple robustness checks for alternative codings and model specifications. At the same time, the analysis shows that this strategy took place in a specific region of the country; this meant that its overall effect was insufficient by itself to overturn the result without considering the all other vote-buying strategies that occurred during the election.

My analysis relies on the assumption that the proximity to the stores is conditionally orthogonal to alternative mechanisms that may affect the electoral results. To back this assumption, I first show that voters' proximity to the stores is *un*correlated with their political behavior and previous electoral results at the precinct level. Moreover, using multiple placebo tests for the time and the location of this instance of vote buying, I demonstrate that the documented vote swings are absent in previous elections, and that they do not appear if the stores belonged to a different retailer than the one involved in the vote-buying allegations. In other words, the novelty of the vote-buying method in 2012 and the exogenous location of the stores help me establish an explanatory direction of the claimed effects.

This research contributes to the literature of redistributive politics by reconciling the documented prevalence of vote buying with its scarce evidence regarding its electoral returns. The proposed empirical approach allows us to study an innovative technology by one of the parties that was not used in previous elections and whose benefits differ across voters in an exogenous way. One could address the same question with survey data, but we could not distinguish whether electoral behavior was affected by receiving the hand-out or vice versa. In other words, this empirical approach allows us to rule out reverse causality. Of course, the main limitation of using aggregated data is the risk of falling into an ecological fallacy, but the fact that precincts are generally made up of a relatively small number of individuals who share similar characteristics should mitigate these concerns. This approach can help us to identify the electoral returns of similar clientelistic instances,

such as the distribution of food vouchers in Egypt (Blaydes, 2011, p. 107), gas discounts in India (Gottipati, 2014), or welfare vouchers in Georgia (Hasen, 2000, p. 1329).

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main empirical limitations when it comes to identifying the returns of vote buying. Section 3 reviews the case study, provides contextual information, and proposes its observable implications. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and research design before presenting the empirical findings, demonstrating the robustness of the results and estimating the size of the effects. Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications of the results, suggesting further lines of research.

2 The Electoral Returns of Vote Buying

An often implicit assumption in the literature of electoral clientelism is that vote buying affects voters' preferences on the ballot. Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrating the persuasive effects of vote buying is limited and conflicting. For instance, research from Taiwan estimates the size of the vote-buying "leakage," or the share of benefited voters who break their promise, at about one-half (Wang and Kurzman, 2007). In India, experimental and qualitative approaches exhibit the limited ability of party brokers to guess voters' preferences (Schneider, 2014; Chauchard, 2016). In Mexico, evidence shows that media campaigns can influence voters' behavior in a more effective way than handouts (Greene, 2016). Even in those cases in which a handout reception correlates with vote intention, the relationship vanishes once scholars account for voters' socioeconomic characteristics, political engagement, or mobilization costs (Stokes et al., 2013; Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Schaffer and Baker, 2015).

The theoretical implication for these null results is the inefficiency of vote buying to ensure voters' responsiveness on the ballot. Unlike turnout buying, where parties mobilize their own core supporters (Nichter, 2008), vote buying involves transactions on the spot market with voters lacking a long-term relationship with the party. These improvised interactions make parties and brokers unable to distinguish "if the outcome is the result of the clientelistic transfers or voters' propensity to turn out and vote for the party" (Szwarcberg, 2015, p. 74). Therefore, the meager effects of vote buying are a consequence of the precarious conditions in which parties target voters whose reliability is hard to guess.

However, the documented null effects of vote buying have alternative, complementary explanations. One such explanation is that these transactions often occur in competitive settings, where the vote-buying efforts of the parties offset in equilibrium. In other words, when multiple parties engage in vote buying, the vote gains of each party are often similar to the votes it loses, neutralizing the result. Similar to the campaign effects in American elections (Sides and Vavreck, 2013), the estimated null effect does not mean that vote buying is an irrelevant strategy. Rather, it suggests that whenever a party stops engaging in this practice, its rivals will directly benefit (Chauchard, 2016).

As a result, the benefits of vote buying can be perceived only in unbalanced settings, in which one side is more efficient distributing material goods. Indeed, most of the documented cases of political clientelism come from settings where one of the parties enjoys an organizational or resource advantage to allocate goods over its rivals or to ensure voters' responsiveness on the ballot (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Chandra, 2004; Magaloni, 2006). This superiority is not necessarily permanent. A party's temporary advantages over its rivals may also come from innovations in its vote-buying methods. These novel methods include, for example, selling lottery tickets whose prize is contingent on the electoral'' result (Callahan and McCargo, 1996, p. 387) or distributing currency split in half to voters with the promise of giving them the other half when they show up at the polling station (Blaydes, 2011, p. 105-106). The rewards of these innovations, however, can be observed only in the short run, since other parties are likely to mimic and neutralize such strategies.

A second alternative explanation is that the returns of vote buying are hard to see when pooling together the behavior of multiple vote groups targeted for different electoral goals.

Whether politicians buy votes, (de)mobilize voters, or reward their core supporters will depend on the goal of the party and the specific characteristics of the citizens involved in the transaction (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016). In the case of vote buying, a party's goal is to increase its vote returns by pulling in the support of potential opposition voters. As a result, vote buyers target not only those voters willing to shift their support on the ballot but those likely to show up at the polling station (Nichter, 2008). To minimize expenses, parties concentrate their efforts on voters with low mobilization costs who can be compensated only for misrepresenting their political preferences (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, p. 421). Therefore, an accurate assessment of the effects of vote buying should, for example, identify those voters who had previously supported the opposition and were mobilized in the past. If analysis do not identify voters more likely to participate in a vote-buying scheme, its effects in the aggregate may be washed away.

An additional roadblock for identifying the returns of vote buying is the use of survey data. Scholars have proposed creative ways of estimating the prevalence and consequences of vote buying after addressing issues such as social desirability (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Corstange, 2012; Imai, Park and Greene, 2015) or the non-random allocation of hand-outs (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). Despite these advances, identifying the returns of vote buying using survey information presents two potential limitations. First, most of these data come from post-electoral surveys in which the respondent reports both the reward reception and vote preference. Since both variables are recorded after the election, their measurement leaves it unclear whether a voter's support is a consequence of the handout or whether receiving the handout is a result of the individual's *ex-ante* support. Second, the estimated effect of vote buying is conditional to the survey question's wording and the set of goods that researchers defined as clientelistic in their analysis (Nichter, 2014). In sum, while survey instruments are useful for estimating the prevalence of vote buying, they face important drawbacks when measuring its consequences on the ballot.

The analysis below proposes a method to address some of the empirical limitations of estimating the returns of vote buying in three ways. First, it provides evidence of an appreciable but fleeting effect of vote buying. In particular, the empirical analysis explores an event where an innovation for a vote-buying transaction gave one of the parties a temporary advantage over its rivals. Second, the empirical design distinguishes those voters identified in the literature as the most responsive to the vote-buying efforts. In particular, I can indirectly identify those voters who previously showed up at polling stations and supported a party *other* than the one engaged in the vote-buying transaction. Finally, the data I use allows me to rule out reverse causality in the analysis. This advantage comes from the exogenous location of the stores where voters could redeem the vote-buying reward and the fact that this type of reward allocation did not affect the results of previous elections.

3 Political Background: Mexico's 2012 Election

On July 1, 2012, Mexicans voted to choose their president. The election pitted Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) against Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and Josefina Vázquez Mota of the incumbent National Action Party (PAN).² On election night, officials declared Peña Nieto the winner of the contest with 38.2% of the vote, followed by López Obrador with 31.6% and Vázquez Mota with 25.4%. However, the results of the election were contested by López Obrador and his campaign staff, who accused the PRI of vote-buying practices in urban neighborhoods of Mexico City and the State of Mexico. Aside from the various

² Peña Nieto's candidacy was endorsed by a coalition composed by the PRI and the Green Party (PVEM). Similarly, López Obrador's candidacy was endorsed by a left-leaning coalition of the PRD, the Citizen Movement (MC), and the Labor Party (PT). While including the vote shares of all of these parties in the empirical analysis below, I omit them from the text for the sake of clarity.

goods that PRI operators delivered before the election,³ the allegations focused on an ingenious vote-buying method that came to light just a couple of days before the election. This involved PRI operators handing out prepaid gift cards to voters in exchange for support to Peña Nieto. The cards were allegedly loaded on election night and could be redeemed at *Soriana*, one of the largest supermarket chain stores in the country (Flores-Macías, 2013; Palmer-Rubin and Nichter, 2015).⁴

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the gift cards were distributed among individuals other than the PRI's core voters, and three pieces of information support this contention. First, unlike the documented clientelistic practices in the Mexican countryside (?), most of the news reports emanated from urban areas and neighborhoods that had long been solid PRD strongholds. These reports are consistent with data available at the individual level. Using the Mexico 2012 Panel Study (Greene et al., 2012), Palmer-Rubin and Nichter (2015) find that the PRD's weaker supporters were more likely to report receiving a gift during the presidential campaign. Moreover, as Section C in the Appendix shows, survey respondents living in PRD strongholds in Mexico City and the State of Mexico were more likely to agree with the statement that politicians often buy votes in their communities.

Second, PRI operators distributed cards among voters whose party preferences were uncertain and unfeasible to monitor at the polling booth. News reports cited several declarations from voters who said they received the cards from people they met at random and who did not ask questions about their partisan attachments.⁵ These news reports go along with existent evidence, from Mexico and elsewhere, regarding the problems that

³ See, for example, "Peña Nieto: triunfo cuestionado," *Reforma*, July 12 2012, p. 1.

⁴ For a detailed account of this event, see Simpser, Alberto, "Could the PRI have bought its electoral result in the 2012 Mexican election? Probably Not," *The Monkey Cage*, July 10, 2012 (http://themonkeycage.org/2012/07/10/could-the-pri-havebought-its-electoral-result-in-the-2012-mexican-election-probably-not/).

⁵ "Dan hasta zapatos en zona tricolor," *Reforma*, July 6, 2012; "¿Quieren ganarse una feria?," *Reforma*, July 4, 2012.

urban brokers face in guessing voters' electoral preferences (Tosoni, 2007; Becerra, 2012; Mercado, 2013; Greene, 2016; Chauchard, 2016).

To overcome these shortcomings, PRI operators told voters that they could redeem the cards contingent on a positive outcome for the PRI's candidate. In the words of a gift-card recipient, "They [the party operators] gave us the cards. They told us that [the cards] would be activated in July, after the election date, and only if the PRI wins."⁶ The ability to condition the rewards gave party operators an unusual opportunity to increase the expected returns of the handouts.

Finally, PRI operators anticipated the potentially opportunistic behavior of the targeted voters with a scam about the real value of the cards. Indeed, the event stoked the media's attention when voters ranted about not being able to cash out what brokers promised (Palmer-Rubin and Nichter, 2015).⁷ The low value of the cards is consistent with the theoretical expectation of how parties deal with opportunistic voters who receive additional offers from other machines (Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky, 2008; Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). Moreover, the scam suggests that the PRI targeted voters with whom it was not interested in establishing a long-term relationship (Nichter, 2008).

In sum, the anecdotal evidence described a vote-buying method that took place in a

- ⁶ "Sin fondos, tarjetas Soriana; se dicen timados por el PRI," La Jornada, July 5 2012, p.
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- ⁷ See, for example, "Mexico Presidential Election: Accusations Of Vote-Buying Grow," The Huffington Post, July 3, 2012. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2012/07/03/mexico-presidential-election-vote-buying_n_1647857.html); "Mexico elections: claims of dirty tricks cast shadow over Peña Nieto's victory," The Guardian, July 4, 2012 (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/04/ mexico-elections-shadow-pena-nieto); "Officials Review Mexico Poll Result," Wall Street Journal. July 5, 2012. (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052702304550004577507180945059366); "Reparten tarjetas a días de elección." Reforma, July 5, 2012, p. 4.

specific region of the country and targeted a specific group of voters. The question to be answered is whether, or how much, the cards affected voters' behavior and the electoral outcome. On the one hand, López Obrador alleged the distribution of 1.8 million cards and their determinant effect on the electoral outcome.⁸ On the other hand, the Electoral Court ruled against the formal complaint, arguing that the mere existence of the cards did not prove they had been distributed by Peña Nieto and his coalition.⁹ I propose below an approach that could help us identify the electoral returns of the cards, estimating their overall effect on the electoral result.

3.1 Observable Implications

To estimate the electoral returns of the cards, I consider different groups of voters relative to their proximity to the closest store where they could redeem the cards. I assume that the proximity to the store determines voters' opportunity cost for cashing out the cards in terms of gas, public transportation fees, and traveling time. Thus, so the closer a voter is to the store, hereafter *Soriana*, the higher her net valuation is for redeeming the card. Therefore, holding everything else equal, cardholders' net valuation of and responsiveness to the cards should increase with voters' proximity to *Soriana*.

The most straightforward way to evaluate the effect of the cards would be to compare the recipients' votes at different geographical proximities from their homes the stores. This approach, however, proves unfeasible because of the secrecy of the vote and the absence of public records on the individual recipients of the cards. Instead, I analyze electoral results

⁸ "Reparte PRI miles de tarjetas para despensas en Edomex, denuncia Monreal," *Proceso*, June 28 2012 (http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=312490); "Denuncia el Movimiento Progresista campaña tarjetera en el Edomex," *La Jornada*, June 29, 2012, p. 6; "Triangulan fondos empresas fantasma," *Reforma*, July 14, 2012, p. 3.

⁹ The ruling from the Electoral Court, SUP-JIN-359/2012, was voted on and approved on August 30, 2012.

and grocery-store proximities at the electoral precinct level, arranging voters according to their residential locations.¹⁰ Using data at this level of aggregation allows me to compare relatively small groups of voters with similar electoral and socioeconomic characteristics.

Following theoretical work on the conditions in which clientelistic strategies work (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014), parties should exert the greatest vote-buying efforts among opposition voters with the lowest reservation prices. The incentives for targeting opposition voters follow the goal of not only adding votes to the party but also reducing those from the rivals. To minimize costs, parties look for those opposition voters with two additional characteristics. The first characteristic is that these voters' turnout costs are low, or have been already covered by someone else, so that parties can compensate the voters only for shifting their vote intention. Second, the electoral preferences of these voters are elastic, requiring the lowest compensation to modify their choice on the ballot (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Therefore, parties are likely to target for vote buying those voters who (1) supported the opposition in the past, (2) live in areas where the opposition had exerted mobilization efforts, and (3) are more likely to value the reward.

When targeting voter groups with these characteristics, parties identify those more likely to sell their votes by looking at their previous electoral choices. Similar to the way in which brokers monitor voters' loyalty (Rueda, 2017) or parties monitor brokers' efforts (Szwarcberg, 2015; Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin, 2016), the information at the precinct level helps political machines gauge the returns of targeting goods in specific sets of voters. I then identify those electoral bastions of the opposition with a relatively high turnout rate. Meanwhile, I estimate the voters' valuation of the good using their proximity to the closest *Soriana*, a proxy of the pecuniary costs voters face when redeeming the cards.

The empirical analysis then tests whether the cards helped the PRI buy votes from citizens likely to turn out and who have previously supported the PRD. This logic implies

¹⁰ Precincts are the smallest electoral subunits and they usually group voters into units of 50 to 1,500 (*Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales* 2014, Art. 253).

observing larger vote shares for Peña Nieto and lower shares for López Obrador in the PRD-mobilized strongholds. Moreover, these effects should be larger among those voters living closer the store. Specifically, if the cards resulted in a shift of votes from the PRD to the PRI, I expect that within the highly mobilized PRD strongholds, proximity to a *Soriana* store is associated with an *increase* in votes for Peña Nieto and a *decrease* in votes for López Obrador.

The vote-buying effects should be perceivable among only PRD voters, given their socioeconomic and ideological characteristics. PRD voters have a lower reservation price than PAN voters, making them a cheaper group from which to buy votes (Becerra, 2012). Moreover, a party using vote buying prefers to target voters ideologically closer to its political platform (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). As scholars have systematically shown, the PRI's platform is relatively closer to the economic and social positions of PRD supporters than PAN ones (Moreno, 2003; Greene, 2007).¹¹

In sum, if the cards were part of a vote-buying strategy to effectively persuade voters, then voters should electorally support the party that offered the reward instead pf the party they have previously supported. Moreover, this effect should intensify with voters' proximity to the closest store. By exploiting the exogenous locations of voters to the closest store, I show below the potential returns of the gift cards and check for alternative explanations.

¹¹ The last module of The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2012) confirms this fact. When respondents are asked to place themselves and the different parties on a left-to-right ideological scale, the mean distance between the PRI's location and the respondents' self-placement is 1.01 among those self-identified with the PAN and only 0.19 for those self-identified with the PRD.

4 Data and Identification Strategy

4.1 Data

To test the potential effects of cards as a clientelistic strategy, I build a database with electoral and sociodemographic information for the precincts in Mexico City and the State of Mexico, places where the evidence for this vote-buying instance originates. The outcomes of interest are candidates' vote shares and turnout rates in the 2012 presidential election. To separate the swings in candidates' support from variations in turnout, the vote shares use as a denominator the number of registered voters in the precinct. As shown below, the results also hold when I instead use as a denominator the number of total votes in the precinct.

The main explanatory variable is *Proximity_i*, the inverse distance between the centroid of precinct *i* and its closest *Soriana* store. The inputs for this variable come from the shape-files provided by the National Electoral Institute's (INE) website¹² as well as the addresses of the *Soriana* stores open by July 2012.¹³ To build upon this variable, I coded the geographic coordinates of every *Soriana* store and got a matrix of Euclidean distances in kilometers between each centroid and the stores, picking the lowest value for each precinct.

To characterize the group of voters likelier to respond to vote buying, I classify precincts according to their previous electoral results. $Stronghold_i^j$, then, is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when party $j \in \{PRI, PRD, PAN\}$ received the majority the votes in precinct *i* during the previous federal election. Similarly, $HighMobilization_i$ gets a value of 1 if the turnout rate at *i* in the previous federal election was at least one standard deviation above

¹² http://www.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/interiores/ Detalle_geografia_electoral_y_cartografia_transparencia-id-04a9d8bd4ac04210VgnVCM1000000c68000aRCRD/

¹³ http://www1.soriana.com/site/default.aspx?p=3121. Accessed on July 7, 2012. To estimate the effect of this variable among equivalent units, I estimate this variable for those precincts in a radius of 20 kilometers from any store.

the overall participation rate. Characterizing precincts as binary variables allows me to test the predictions of the PRI's allocation of the cards as a way to erode rival parties in their bastions. Section 5.2 demonstrates that the results are robust to alternative coding specifications for the main independent variables.

The analysis also includes a battery of electoral and socioeconomic controls at the precinct level using the 2010 Census data.¹⁴ The variables include information about the precincts' inhabitants and household conditions, such as education level, the share of people in the labor market, and access to utilities—i.e., electricity, piped water, and sewage—among other services. Section A in the Supplementary Information provides the description and summary statistics of the variables in the analysis.

4.2 Identification Assumption

The empirical analysis relies on the assumption that, after controlling for the precincts' observable characteristics, the location of the *Soriana* stores is not correlated with political behavior. I verify for the exogeneity of the location for the 71 stores opened in the Federal District and in the State of Mexico by July 2012 in two indirect ways. First, to test for a potential correlation between proximity to the store and citizens' political values, I use survey data from the National Values Survey, administered to 1,600 citizens in Mexico City and the State of Mexico in August 2010.¹⁵ This survey inquires about citizens' political attitudes and activities, and its sample is representative at the state level. By matching each respondent's electoral precinct with her corresponding value of *Proximity*, I test whether living closer to a *Soriana* store is correlated with different types of attitudes and political values.

For this test, I regress four sets of dependent variables on *Proximity* and a vector of sociodemographic variables. Each set of dependent variables—partisan identification, gov-

¹⁴ http://gaia.inegi.org.mx/geoelectoral/viewer.html

¹⁵ http://bdsocial.inmujeres.gob.mx/index.php/envud-292/13-acervo/aceingles

ernment approval, political membership, and political interest—includes a battery of questions made in a similar format. Figure 1 summarizes the results of this exercise by showing the coefficient values for *Proximity*.¹⁶ In no case does proximity to the stores have a significant effect on the respondents' answers, suggesting that citizens' residence with respect to distance from the grocery stores is uncorrelated with political behavior.

Second, based on Enikopolov, Petriva and Zhuravskaya's (2011) test for the exogeneity of TV transmitter locations in Russia, Table B.6 in the Supporting Information presents the correlates of the precincts' characteristics with proximity to the stores and the interactions used in the benchmark specification. The results show that the relationship of the electoral variables with *Proximity* disappears once the sociodemographic controls are included. Also, the electoral variables barely add explanatory power to the regressions, as the value for the R^2 does not change when the vote shares are excluded from the models. In sum, these tests suggest that the location of the *Soriana* stores in Mexico City and the State of Mexico in July 2012 is conditionally orthogonal to voters' behavior, providing support for the identification strategy.

4.3 Estimation

Let $y_{i,m}$ be the electoral outcomes in precinct *i* and municipality *m* in the 2012 presidential election. The linear model to estimate is the following:

¹⁶ The complete results for this test are in the Supporting Information.



Figure 1: Coefficients for *Proximity* to *Soriana* stores in regressions for political values and information. Mexico City and the State of Mexico, 2010.

Notes: Data obtained from the 2010 National Values Survey (ENVUD). The panels show the coefficients and confidence intervals of proximity to the *Soriana* stores of the survey's respondents and their answers to four different types of questions. (1) Partisan identification: "Do you usually identify yourself with the (PRI/PAN/PRD)?" (2) Governmental Approval: "Overall, do you approve or disapprove the way (the President/the Governor/Congress) is doing (his/her/its) job?" (3) Political Membership: "Do you belong to any of the following associations (Political party/Union/Religious group)?" (4) Political Awareness: "On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'nothing' and 10 means 'a lot,' please tell me how much (are you interested in politics/are you interested in elections/do you talk about politics/do you follow political news)?" Model 1 shows the coefficients for a multinomial model and models 2-4 were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression models. All estimations are controlled by gender, age, socioeconomic level, education, rural or urban residence, and access to mobile phone and internet. Complete results are available in Section B of the Supplementary Information.

$$y_{i,m} = \alpha + \beta Proximity_{i} + \gamma HighMobilization_{i} + \sum_{j=PRI}^{PAN} \delta_{j}Stronghold_{i}^{j} + \zeta(Proximity_{i} \times HighMobilization_{i}) + \sum_{j=PRI}^{PAN} \eta_{j}(Proximity_{i} \times Stronghold_{i}^{j}) + \sum_{j=PRI}^{PAN} \theta_{j}(HighMobilization_{i} \times Stronghold_{i}^{j}) + \sum_{j=PRI}^{PAN} \kappa_{j}(Proximity_{i} \times HighMobilization_{i} \times Stronghold_{i}^{j}) + \mu \mathbf{X}_{i} + \lambda_{m} + \epsilon_{i,m}$$

$$(1)$$

Where X_i is a vector containing electoral and sociodemographic controls at the precinct level, and λ_m are municipal fixed effects. All models include robust standard errors clustered by electoral district.

The estimate of interest is the marginal effect of *Proximity* on the electoral results of the PRD mobilized strongholds, which is obtained as follows:

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial Proximity} = \beta + \zeta HighMobilization + \eta_{PRD}Stronghold^{PRD} + \kappa_{PRD}(HighMobilization \times Stronghold^{PRD})$$
(2)

As discussed above, empirical support for the vote-buying hypothesis implies that, within the mobilized PRD strongholds, the marginal effect of *Proximity* is negative on the vote shares of the PRD's López Obrador's and positive on the vote shares of the PRI's Peña Nieto. I estimate the marginal effects of *Proximity* in other party strongholds in a similar way.¹⁷

¹⁷ Standard errors are estimated using the Delta Method (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1992).

5 Results

Using these measures and estimation strategy, below I provide evidence of the persuasive effects of the cards in the mobilized PRD strongholds. Next, I verify that these effects are robust to alternative codings and model specifications. I then show that the results hold only for the 2012 election and the proximity of the precincts to the aforementioned stores. Finally, I prove that the magnitude of these effects is marginal relative to the electoral outcome and the allegations of the PRI's rivals.

5.1 Benchmark Results

Table 1 shows the main regression results for turnout and vote shares for the three main candidates during the 2012 election. Column 1 presents the results for the PRI's Peña Nieto, the candidate accused of using illegal resources for clientelistic practices. Column 2 features the results of the PRD's López Obrador, the second-place candidate who claimed his electoral defeat was the result of the PRI's vote-buying strategies. Column 3 looks at the effect on the PAN's Vázquez Mota, the candidate for the incumbent party who finished third in the presidential race. Finally, Column 4 shows the result for turnout rates in the precinct. The tables with the full regression and marginal effects for all the analyses described below are available in the Supplementary Information.

The estimates of interest using Equation 2 for each mobilized stronghold are shown in Table 2, which illustrates the marginal effects of *Proximity* on every electoral outcome across different mobilized strongholds. In this case, the table shows the average vote share change for each of the candidates in the specific type of precinct by changing a unit value of $Proximity = \frac{1}{\text{distance in kilometers}}$. Consistent with the vote-buying hypothesis, *Proximity* has heterogeneous effects in the PRD's highly mobilized strongholds for the two front-runner candidates. For example, the effect of moving a PRD stronghold from one kilometer to 500 meters to a Soriana store would increase the vote share in the precinct for Peña Nieto about

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PRI stronghold	-0.847^{**}	-0.137	0.342	-0.651^{***}
	(0.270)	(0.307)	(0.188)	(0.185)
	4 0/4444	0.001	0.045	0.00/***
PRD stronghold	-1.061***	0.201	0.045	-0.896***
	(0.285)	(0.342)	(0.177)	(0.227)
PAN stronghold	1 680**	6 075***	2 727***	1 606***
rAn stronghold	1.000	-6.075	5.257	-1.090
	(0.528)	(0.866)	(0.604)	(0.475)
High Mobilization	-0.441	-0.061	0.208	-0.397
ingr mobilization	(0.373)	(0.411)	(0.345)	(0.230)
	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.040)	(0.200)
Proximity	-0.003	-0.003	0.030*	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.015)
	()	()	()	()
imes PRI stronghold	0.150	-0.003	0.034	0.117
0	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.118)	(0.149)
	· · /		· · · ·	
imes PRD stronghold	0.469*	-0.283	-0.014	0.162
C	(0.202)	(0.215)	(0.100)	(0.194)
imes PAN stronghold	-0.850**	1.237***	-0.014	0.450^{*}
	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.213)
imes High Mobilization	-0.099	-0.046	-0.030	-0.187^{*}
	(0.207)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.078)
	0.404	0.040	a aa -	0.400
× PRI stronghold	-0.134	0.048	-0.087	-0.120
×High Mobilization	(0.295)	(0.214)	(0.160)	(0.189)
V PRD stronghold	20 200*	20 630**	1 111	7 207
× I KD Stronghold	(12 (55)	-20.030	(8.221)	(0.616)
× High Mobilization	(12.655)	(7.236)	(8.331)	(9.010)
× PAN stronghold	-2.031	-5 810***	4 707*	-3 707**
× High Mobilization	(1.890)	(0.658)	(2.067)	(1.228)
	(1.070)	(0.000)	(2.007)	(1.220)
Electoral and Socioeconomic Controls	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
\mathbb{R}^2	0.873	0.866	0.910	0.811
F - statistic (df = 147)	494.9***	464.6***	730.8***	308.8***

Table 1: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include municipal fixed effects, 2009 electoral shares and turnout rates, and sociodemographic characteristics of the precincts. The full table is in the Supplementary Information. *** is significant at the 0.1 percent level, ** is significant at the 1 percent level, and * is significant at the 5 percent level.

30 percent. The effect is similar in size yet in the opposite direction for López Obrador. In contrast, the magnitude of the significant effects within PAN strongholds is very small and does not hold in many of the robustness checks described below. Finally, the fact that the effects on turnout are not statistically significant suggests that the shifts in electoral support are due to the change in voters' preferences, not mobilization strategies.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.087	-0.005	-0.053	-0.167
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.096)
PRD Stronghold	29.757	-20.962	1.097	7.204
C C	(12.704)	(7.207)	(8.330)	(9.612)
PAN Stronghold	-2.984	-4.622	4.693	-3.422
Ũ	(1.870)	(0.680)	(2.084)	(1.208)

Table 2: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election.

Notes: This table presents the marginal effects of *Proximity*, estimated as the inverse distance in kilometers between precinct *i* and the closest *Soriana* store, as denoted in Equation 2. The numbers show the average change on the vote shares by changing the proximity to Soriana in $\frac{1}{\text{distance in kilometers}}$ units. Standard errors are in parentheses.

To illustrate the estimates of interest, Figure 2 shows the marginal effects on the candidates' vote shares of the mobilized PRD strongholds at various proximities from the closest *Soriana*. The ribbons in the graph represent the 95% confidence intervals for the change in the candidate's vote share at a given proximity from the store. For those precincts at three kilometers from a store, the PRD strongholds adds an additional 10% to Peña Nieto's vote share, and it decreases the vote share for López Obrador by a similar amount. In contrast, for those precincts located at twelve or more kilometers from the closest store, PRDmobilized strongholds have negligible vote shifts, as the marginal effect on Peña Nieto's vote share is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Unlike the case for the front-runner candidates, *Proximity* does not have an impact on the PAN's Vázquez Mota vote shares, as the marginal effect on this vote outcome remains constant at various distances from a *Soriana* store. As Figure D.1 in the Supplementary Information shows, the plots for the PRI- and PAN- mobilized strongholds present no significant effects for *Proximity* in any electoral outcome.

Overall, the results show that Peña Nieto's vote shares were higher in mobilized PRD strongholds close to the stores and that, in the same precints, López Obrador's vote share decreased at a similar rate. Also, the findings show no evidence supporting party mobilization strategies, as the proximity to the store within the PRI strongholds is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The effects of the *Proximity* variable suggest this vote-buying strategy was targeted at a specific group of voters and that its success depended on voters' pecuniary costs for redeeming the cards.

5.2 Robustness and Placebo Tests

The findings described above suggest that the persuasive effects were larger among those voters living in PRD strongholds closer to the stores where they could redeem the gift cards. To check for the robustness of the results and the validity of their interpretation, I rerun the analysis under different model specifications and placebo treatments. The results of these exercises are summarized in Figure 3, which shows the estimated marginal effects of *Proximity* in the PRD-mobilized strongholds, similar to those estimated for Table 2.

Plot 3(a) shows that the marginal effects obtained from the benchmark results are similar to those estimated under three alternative variable codings. First, I coded the vote shares as the proportion of the total number of votes, rather than the number of registered voters supporting each of the candidates. Second, I also consider an alternative specification of the dependent variable using the parties' vote share change between 2009 and 2012. Finally, I explore the robustness of the findings using a transit route API to estimate the driving proximity between every precinct's centroid and the *Soriana* stores. In all of these cases, the marginal effects are similar in magnitude to those presented in Table 2.

The Supplementary Information checks the consistency of the results after addressing four potential concerns. First, Tables E.7 to E.10 show the persistence of the results

Figure 2: Predicted Vote Shares of Mobilized PRD Strongholds by Proximity to the *Soriana* Stores.



Notes: The plot shows the estimated vote share for each candidate with respect to the PRD mobilized strongholds at different values of *Proximity* to the *Soriana* stores. The figure keeps fixed the value of *HighMobilization* and *PRDStronghold* at 1, varying the value for *Proximity* within the $\left[\frac{1}{20}, \frac{1}{2.5}\right]$ interval. Lines depict the point estimates for each vote result, and the ribbons represent the 95% confidence intervals.

when using different thresholds for coding the party strongholds and mobilized precincts. Second, to test for the possibility that the claimed effects are artifacts of the omitted relationship between *Proximity* and other covariates, Table E.12 presents a model interacting *Proximity* with every independent variable. Third, the OLS model may give inaccurate estimations because the dependent variable ranges within an interval between 0 and 100, but the prediction equation is not constrained to this interval. Similar to Franklin (2004, p. 76), Table E.14 shows the estimates when each dependent variable $y_{i,m}$ is logistically transformed to $ln(\frac{y_{i,m}}{1-y_{i,m}})$. Finally, since the errors for the models testing the four dependent variables are likely to be correlated, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to test for whether this correlation affects the claimed results (Zellner, 1962). The effects hold in all these cases.

An additional concern for the analysis is the possibility that the vote swings arise from differences in unobserved characteristics of the precincts. To assess the plausibility of alternative explanations across space and time, Plot 3(b) shows the results of four different placebo treatments. First, I replicate the analysis using as the dependent variable the vote shares from the 2006 and 2009 federal elections. Next, it also might be the case that the findings are not exclusive to the State of Mexico and Mexico City, where most of the qualitative evidence involving this instance come from. Therefore, I replicate the analysis considering the precincts outside the State of Mexico and Mexico City and at least 20 kilometers from one of the 468 *Soriana* stores opened in July of 2012 in the rest of the country. Also, I estimate the potential effects of the precincts' proximity to the stores of Walmart-Mexico, the largest supermarket chain in the country and *Soriana*'s main competitor.¹⁸ As Figure A.2 in the Supplementary Information shows, the stores are closely located to each other and customers of both supermarket chains have similar socioeconomic characteristics. If the marginal effects of this test are similar to those in the benchmark model, there would be

The addresses of the stores are available at http://www.walmart.com.mx/buscadorde-tiendas.aspx.



Figure 3: Robustness Checks and Placebo Tests

Notes: Plot 3(a) presents the marginal effects for *Proximity* in the PRD strongholds using three alternative model specifications. Model 1 uses as dependent variable the share of votes for every candidate out of the total votes in the precinct. Model 2 uses as dependent variable the change in the vote shares from 2009 to 2012. Model 3 estimates the effect for proximity using the driving distance from every precinct to the closest store. Similarly, Plot 3(b) presents the marginal effects for *Proximity* in the PRD strongholds using three placebo models. Model 1 and 2 use as dependent variable the vote shares in the 2006 and 2009 elections, respectively. Model 3 replicates the analysis for the precincts outside the State of Mexico and Mexico City and within 20 kilometers of distance from a *Soriana* store. Model 4 estimates the effect for proximity to Walmart stores in the 2012 election. Dots are the point estimate of the marginal effects, and lines represent the 95% confidence interval. The marginal effects for every type of stronghold and full tables are in the Appendix.

substantive reasons to believe that the claimed relationship is explained by citizens' characteristics other than their proximity to *Soriana* stores. The estimated marginal effects for all these tests are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Finally, to tackle any potential arbitrary error structure in the data, I use randomization inference (Gerber and Green, 2012; Erikson, Pinto and Rader, 2014; Sanchez de la Sierra,

2014). For this procedure, I build a set of 387 grocery store locations using the addresses of the *Soriana* stores and three other supermarket chains in Mexico City and the State of Mexico.¹⁹ I then simulate 1,000 samples of 71 potential *Soriana* locations—as this was the number of *Soriana* stores in the two entities in July 2012. For every simulation, I recalculate the *Proximity* variable and estimate its effects on the vote shares for every candidate in the election. The statistic of interest is the marginal effect of *Proximity* on precincts in the PRD-mobilized strongholds precinct as it is specified in Equation 2. I repeat the procedure for each of the 1,000 samples and then compare the resulting distribution with the observed statistic using the actual store allocations.





Notes: The figure presents the distribution of marginal effects for *Proximity* using the simulated store locations. The dashed lines show the observed marginal effects estimated from Table 1.

If the potential spatial auto-correlation of the data leads to false positive findings, then the observed statistic would fall close to the distribution's mean. However, as Figure 4 ¹⁹ The supermarket chains are: *Walmart*, *Bodega Aurrera*, and *Comercial Mexicana*. shows, only 12 randomizations produced an effect larger in magnitude than that observed for the main regressor in López Obrador's vote share (p = 0.012). Similarly, only two of the 1,000 randomizations reported a larger marginal effect on Peña Nieto's vote share than those estimated using the real location of the *Soriana* stores (p = 0.002). The results from the randomization inference suggest that the effects are rarely explained by factors other than the stores' specific locations.

5.3 Estimating the Magnitude of the Effects

Now that the persuasive effects of the store cards have been identified, the last part of this analysis demonstrates that the scope of this event was limited to a specific group of voters. To accomplish this goal, I compare the candidates' vote aggregates in the PRD-mobilized strongholds with those estimated in two counterfactual scenarios in which all the PRD-mobilized precincts are at either 2.5 or 15 kilometers from the closest store.

As Table 3 shows, the observed totals for the two main candidates in the PRD-mobilized strongholds are less than 50,000 votes—enough to crowd several grocery stores but insufficient to change the election result. As expected, locating the closest store to 15 kilometers from these precincts has no significant effects in the vote totals for the candidates. In contrast, locating the stores 2.5 kilometers from the precincts would increase the votes for Peña Nieto by almost 7,500 votes and decrease those for López Obrador by about 5,500 votes. Even in the counterfactual scenario in which all strongholds are located at 2.5 kilometers from a *Soriana* store, the marginal effects in the vote totals fall far short of validating López Obrador's allegation involving the distribution of 1.8 million gift cards.

This result does not mean that the overall vote buying efforts had no effects on the final result. Rather, the marginal effects shown on Table 3 represent the observable outcome of a complex network of clientelistic strategies from all parties during the election. As discussed in Section 2, the competing persuasion strategies of other parties, together with voters' opportunism, may detach the prevalence of vote buying from its resultant profits.

ederal District and state of mende		
	Peña Nieto	López Obrador
	(PRI)	(PRD)
Aggregated votes in PRD Strongholds	27,463	20,603
a) All PRD strongholds at 15 kms	26,861	20,837
	[26,089, 27,663]	[19,888, 21,787]
b) All PRD strongholds at 2.5 kms	35,198	14,964
	[30,797, 39,598]	[9,553, 20,376]

 Table 3: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential

 Election. Federal District and State of Mexico

Notes: This table shows the estimated magnitude of the effects in votes in the PRD-mobilized strongholds by computing their different distances from the precincts to the closest *Soriana* store. The vote shares for each precinct were computed using Equation 2 and setting the value for *Proximity* to be at 2.5 or 15 kilometers. The resultant shares were multiplied by the number of voters in the precinct. Numbers in brackets denote the 95% confidence intervals.

Moreover, qualitative evidence suggests that the distribution of cards was only one of the multiple strategies that the PRI used to persuade voters on election day.²⁰

In sum, the results of this paper support the claim that gift cards used for vote buying benefited the PRI during the 2012 election. In particular, the persuasive effects of this strategy are noticeable in PRD strongholds closer to *Soriana* stores in Mexico City and the State of Mexico. Nevertheless, since the distribution of the cards targeted voters outside the PRI networks, the electoral return of this strategy is significantly lower than what was claimed by the main losing candidate.

6 Discussion

In many developing democracies, parties distribute individual goods to "tip the balance" of voter support in their favor (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 13). While the literature on redistributive politics often assumes voters' responsiveness to handouts, the empirical literature demonstrating this is very limited. As a result, there is a disconnect between the prevalence of parties' persuasive strategies among swing and opposition voters and the

²⁰ See, for example, "Dan hasta zapatos en zona tricolor," *Reforma*, July 6, 2012, "Resguardan bodega," *Reforma*, July 1, 2012, p. 16.

lack of evidence showing that vote buying indeed works.

Acknowledging the empirical challenges to identifying the effects of vote buying and the theoretical inefficiencies of this transaction, this paper takes advantage of an unusual opportunity to estimate the electoral returns of vote buying. In particular, I use evidence from the 2012 Mexican presidential election to estimate the returns of the gift card distribution by the PRI in PRD strongholds. This event allows me to estimate the potential effect of this good and evaluate its impact on the electoral result. The findings show heterogeneous effects for the two main candidates, supporting the claims of vote buying for this election.

While I focus on a specific event, this study represents an uncommon opportunity to identify the returns of vote buying, whose implications can be generalizable to other contexts. In particular, the findings of this paper try to reconcile two seemingly opposite approaches in the literature of redistributive politics. On the one hand, the results show that parties profit from allocating handouts among non-core constituents. This finding does not suggest that parties can only get electoral returns from targeting swing voters. Rather, it shows the conditions in which vote buying can complement other clientelistic strategies (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016). In particular, the fact that voters outside the PRI's electoral bastions switched their preferences shows the advantages of controlling a disaggregated good whose distribution has uniform transaction costs across voter groups (Dixit and Londregan, 1996).

On the other hand, this strategy appears to be focused on a particular voter group, and its effects were inconsequential to the election outcome. Similar results have been seen in recent works contending the inefficiencies of trading goods in competitive settings (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Schneider, 2014; Chauchard, 2016; Greene, 2016). Together, the evidence invites scholars and political actors to revisit the assumed impact of vote buying on electoral results. At the same time, this analysis also demonstrates the problems of generalizing the consequences of vote buying to the entire electorate. Empirical studies that assume a similar behavior for all party supporters who received a good

may overlook how parties employ for different strategies voter groups, each targeted with an idiosyncratic good and method. Future empirical research on the topic should explore the conditions in which vote buying works and the ways of empirically identifying its effects.

In the specific case of the gift cards in Mexico, the estimated effects are far from indicating that such a distribution is irrelevant. In fact, the issuance of prepaid cards is now a common practice not only for the PRI,²¹ but also for those parties that previously complained about it.²² The contagion effect of this vote-buying method suggests that it is an attractive way to try to gather votes and cancel out the vote-buying efforts of competing political machines.

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- ²¹ Raphael, Ricardo "El Fraude de la Tarjeta Rosa." *El Universal*, June 8, 2017, p. 12;
 "Denuncia Morena a PRI Ante INE por tarjeta salario rosa." *El Financiero*, May 18, 2017, p. 12
- ²² "PRD compra votos con tarjeta 'la empleadora' denuncia PAN ante PGR." El Financiero, June 3, 2015 (http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/prd-compravotos-con-tarjeta-la-empleadora-denuncia-pan-ante-pgr.html); "PRI revive denuncia contra Guillermo Anaya por 'Lavadero con tarjetas'." El Financiero, July 19, 2017 (http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/pri-revive-denunciacontra-guillermo-anaya-por-lavadero-con-tarjetas.html).

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A Data Description and Summary Statistics

A.1 Variables

(*PRI/PRD/PAN*) *Vote Share*. Number of votes for the party or coalition over the registered electorate in the precinct. PRI's vote shares also include the Green Party (PVEM). Similarly, PRD's vote shares include the Citizen Movement (MC) and the Labor Party (PT).

Turnout. Total number of votes cast in the election over the registered electorate in the precinct.

Proximity. Inverted distance in kilometers between the precinct's centroid and the closest *Soriana* store.

(*PRI/PRD/PAN*) *Stronghold*. Indicator coded 1 if the party or coalition supporting the candidate got at least 50% of the votes in the precinct during the previous election.

High Mobilization. Indicator coded 1 if the turnout rate in the precinct during the previous election is at least one standard deviation above the state average rate.

Population Log. The natural logarithm of the population living in the precinct.

Urban. Indicator coded 1 if the precinct has well-defined blocs within an urban locality and has basic services such as electricity and sewage.

Population over 18. Percentage of residents in the electoral precinct who were at least 18 years old in 2010.

Population over 65. Percentage of residents in the electoral precinct who were at least 65 years old in 2010.

Education. Average number of schooling years among the residents in the electoral precinct who were least 15 years old.

College degree. Percentage of the 18-year-old, or older, residents in the electoral precinct with a college degree.

Illiteracy. Percentage of the 15-year-old residents, or older, in the electoral precinct that is illiterate.

Inhabitants per house. Average number of inhabitants per household in the electoral precinct.

Population of the labor market. Percentage of the 12-years-old, or older, residents in the electoral precinct with a job, or in search of a job, during the week that the survey was administered.

Population of the female labor market. Percentage of the 12-year-old, or older, female residents in the electoral precinct with a job, or in search of a job, during the week that the survey was administered.

No Social Insurance. Percentage of the residents in the electoral precinct without social insurance.

Female head of household. Percentage of households in the precinct headed by a female.

Inhabitants per room. Average number of precincts' household residents per room.

Dirt floor. Percentage of households in the precinct with dirt floors.

All Services. Percentage of households in the precinct with drinkable water, sewage, and electricity.

No Services. Percentage of households in the precinct without drinkable water, sewage, or electricity.

Car. Percentage of households in the electoral precinct with a car.

Mobile phone. Percentage of households in the electoral precinct with a cellphone.

Internet. Percentage of households in the electoral precinct with Internet access.

A.2 Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables					
Peña Nieto's vote share	10,634	22.566	7.140	7.512	66.957
López Obrador's vote share	10,634	29.446	8.519	1.900	60.502
Vázquez Mota's vote share	10,634	12.176	6.805	0.763	46.181
Turnout 2012	10,634	0.669	0.059	0.318	0.908
Independent Variables					
Proximity	10,716	0.596	1.251	0.050	91.935
PRI Stronghold	10,716	0.144	0.351	0	1
PRD Stronghold	10,716	0.017	0.128	0	1
PRD Stronghold	10,716	0.059	0.235	0	1
High Mobilization	10,716	0.104	0.305	0	1
PRI Vote Share, 2009	10,716	16.426	7.645	2.348	56.971
PRD Vote Share, 2009	10,716	13.940	5.858	0.126	51.712
PAN Vote Share, 2009	10,716	9.725	6.660	0.357	60.181
Turnout, 2009	10,716	47.867	8.134	15.745	93.878
Population log	10,716	7.072	0.548	0.693	9.876
Urban	10,716	0.934	0.248	0	1
Population over 18, percent	10,716	0.696	0.061	0.400	1.000
Population over 65, percent	10,716	0.074	0.038	0.000	0.250
Average years of schooling	10,716	10.141	1.821	4.080	18.000
Population with college degree, percent	110,716	0.495	0.187	0.000	1.000
Illiterate population, percent	10,716	0.026	0.024	0.000	0.308
Population in the labor market, percent	10,716	0.554	0.043	0.085	0.790
Female population in the labor market, percent	10,716	0.404	0.076	0.023	0.712
Individuals without social security, percent	10,716	0.363	0.107	0.000	0.952
Female head of household, percent	10,716	0.245	0.065	0.000	0.704
Average inhabitants per room	10,716	0.955	0.235	0.000	2.720
Households with dirt floor, percent	10,716	0.018	0.033	0.000	1.000
Households with all services, percent	10,716	0.950	0.126	0.000	1.000
Households with none services, percent	10,716	0.005	0.016	0.000	0.750
Households with car, percent	10,716	0.445	0.176	0.000	1.000
Households with mobile phone, percent	10,716	0.728	0.120	0.000	1.000
Households with internet, percent	10,716	0.333	0.201	0.000	1.000

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

A.3 Location of the Stores



Figure A.1: Location of the *Soriana* stores in Mexico City and the State of Mexico opened by July of 2012.



Figure A.2: Location of the *Soriana* and *Walmart* stores in Mexico City and the State of Mexico opened by July of 2012.

B Identification Strategy

This section shows one of the indirect tests to check for the validity of the *Proximity* variable as an instrument. Specifically, I test for a potential correlation between proximity to the store and citizens' political values, I use survey data from the National Values Survey, administered by to 1,600 citizens in Mexico City and the State of Mexico in August 2010.²³ This survey inquires about citizens' political attitudes and activities and its sample is representative at the state level. By matching the survey respondent's precinct with its correspondent value of *Proximity*, I test whether living closer to a *Soriana* store is correlated with different types of attitudes and political values.

I regress four sets of dependent variables: (1) Partisan identification ("Do you usually identify yourself as..."), (2) Governmental Approval ("Overall, do you approve or disapprove the way (the President/ the Governor/Congress) is doing his/her/its job?"), (3) Political Membership ("Do you belong to any of the following associations"), and (4) Political Awareness ("On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'nothing' and 10 means 'a lot,' please tell me how much do you... ?"). Model 1 shows the coefficients for a multinomial model and models 2-4 were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression models. Each of these sets includes a battery of questions created in a similar format, and all these regressions include controls for age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, mobile phone ownership, internet access, and residence in a rural area.

Also, based on Enikopolov, Petriva and Zhuravskaya's (2011) test for the exogeneity of the TV transmitter locations in Russia, Table B.6 presents the correlates of the proximity to the stores and the precincts' characteristics. This test shows three things. First, the effects of the electoral variables on *Proximity* disappear once the sociodemographic controls are included. Second, the electoral variables barely add explanatory power to the regressions, as the value for the R^2 does not change when the vote shares are excluded from the models.

²³ http://bdsocial.inmujeres.gob.mx/index.php/envud-292/13-acervo/aceingles

In sum, these tests suggest that the location of the *Soriana* stores opened in Mexico City and the State of Mexico between 2005 and 2012 is orthogonal to voters' behavior, providing support for the identification strategy.

B.1 Variables

Dependent Variables

Party Identification:

"Generalmente, ¿usted se considera priísta, panista o perredista? " ["In general, do you identified your self as PRI partisan, PAN partisan, or PRD partisan"]. (PRI, PAN, PRD, Other)

Job Approval:

"En general, ¿usted aprueba o desaprueba la forma como está haciendo su trabajo...? "["In general, do you approve or disapprove the job of ... (the President/ the state Governor, the Congress)?"] (1=Approve, 0=Disapprove)

Political Affiliation:

"¿Usted es miembro de los siguientes grupos u organizaciones? " ["Are you member of any of the following groups or organizations? (Political parties/ Union/ Religious group)"] (1= "Yes", 0= "No")

Political Involvement: "En una escala del 1 al 10, donde 1 significa "nada" y 10 "mucho". ¿A usted...?" ["In a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you... (have interest in politics/ participate in elections/ follows political news/ do you discuss about politics with other people)?"]

Independent Variables

Female. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent is female.

Age. Respondent's age.

Socioeconomic Level. Ordinal variable for the interviewer's classification of the respondent's neighborhood.

Education. Ordinal variable indicating the highest level of education the survey respondent has.

Mobile phone. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent reports owning a mobile phone.

Internet. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent reports having access to internet.

Rural. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent lives in a rural community.

B.2 Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Party Identification:					
PRI/PAN/PRD/Other	1600	0.621	0.025	0	3
Job Approval:					
President	1561	0.423	0.494	0	1
Governor	1565	0.532	0.499	0	1
Congress	1507	0.353	0.478	0	1
Political Affiliation:					
Party	1598	0.017	0.129	0	1
Union	1598	0.018	0.133	0	1
Religious group	1599	0.051	0.221	0	1
Political Involvement:					
Interest in politics	1593	4.477	2.544	0	1
Interest in elections	1592	5.292	2.362	0	1
Discusses politics	1587	4.189	2.427	0	1
Follows news	1593	4.877	2.542	0	1
Proximity	1600	0.501	0.732	0.022	7.020
Gender	1600	0.498	0.050	0	1
Age	1600	41.864	16.486	18	99
Socioeconomic level	1600	3.433	0.985	1	5
Education	1591	2.446	1.371	0	6
Mobile phone	1591	0.419	0.049	0	1
Internet	1576	0.685	0.046	0	1
Rural	1600	0.073	0.026	0	1

Table B.1: Summary Statistics

B.3 Results

J. J	PRI	PAN	PRD
Proximity	-0.053	0.013	-0.102
	(0.100)	(0.127)	(0.140)
Age	0.005	0.003	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Gender	0.079	-0.007	0.176
	(0.138)	(0.208)	(0.175)
Education	-0.285***	-0.054	-0.255***
	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.079)
Socioeconomic Class	-0.243***	-0.316***	-0.132
	(0.077)	(0.120)	(0.097)
Mobile phone	-0.198	-0.085	-0.243
	(0.161)	(0.253)	(0.206)
Internet	-0.318*	-0.438*	-0.335
	(0.175)	(0.248)	(0.215)
Rural	0.286	-1.113	-1.212
	(0.250)	(0.736)	(0.532)
Constant	0.427	0.817	1.084
	(0.602)	(0.817)	(0.866)
$\overline{\chi^2}$	68.67		
Log-likelihood	-1501.3772		
Observations	1533		

Table B.2: Regression model on party identification. Federal District and State of Mexico, 2010. (Multinomial logit)

t statistics in parentheses * *p* < 0.10,** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01

	President's	Governor's	Congress's
	Job Approval	Job Approval	Job Approval
Proximity	0.074	-0.090	0.038
-	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Age	0.002	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Gender	0.213**	0.126	0.155
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.111)
Education	-0.058	-0.0911*	-0.028
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Socioeconomic Class	-0.055	0.096*	-0.118*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Mobile phone	-0.113	-0.064	-0.130
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.129)
Internet	-0.033	0.081	0.042
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.138)
Rural	0.923	0.888	0.665
	(0.217)	(0.244)	(0.229)
Constant	-1.195	-0.905	-0.815
	(0.469)	(0.478)	(0.485)
Observations	1496	1499	1447
Log-likelihood	-1006.908	-1014.734	-931.351

Table B.3: Regression model on Job Approval. Federal District and State of Mexico, 2010. (Logit model, SUR Estimates)

t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

,	Party	Union	Religious Group
Proximity	-0.546	-0.047	0.055
	(0.398)	(0.147)	(0.144)
Age	0.023**	0.020	0.003
-	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Gender	-0.277	0.807	0.315
	(0.404)	(0.439)	(0.242)
Education	0.046	0.450***	-0.122
	(0.170)	(0.126)	(0.093)
Socioeconomic Class	0.168	0.045	-0.113
	(0.214)	(0.260)	(0.123)
Mobile phone	-0.521	0.002	-0.166
-	(0.521)	(0.503)	(0.280)
Internet	-0.257	-0.921	-0.431
	(0.535)	(0.436)	(0.278)
Rural	-0.801	0.109	0.741
	(1.104)	(1.136)	(0.402)
Constant	-3.094	-3.891	-2.799
	(1.674)	(1.628)	(0.895)
Observations	1531	1531	1532
Log-likelihood	-132.386	-126.104	-295.254

Table B.4: Regression model on political affiliation. Federal District and State of Mexico, 2010. (Logit model, SUR Estimates)

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Interest in	Interest in	Discusses	Follows
	politics	elections	politics	news
Proximity	-0.017	-0.087	0.106	0.014
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.085)
Age	0.003	0.005	0.011***	0.011***
-	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender	-0.346***	-0.318***	-0.214*	-0.233*
	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.126)
Education	0.363	0.409	0.397	0.356
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Socioeconomic Class	-0.089	-0.114*	-0.040	-0.051
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.069)
Mobile phone	-0.214	-0.361***	-0.163	-0.225
	(0.148)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.146)
Internet	-0.098	-0.069	-0.329**	-0.411***
	(0.159)	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.158)
Rural	-0.464	0.796	-0.879	-0.639
	(0.263)	(0.241)	(0.247)	(0.261)
Constant	5.239***	4.776***	4.875***	5.753***
	(0.561)	(0.513)	(0.525)	(0.555)
Observations	1533	1533	1533	1533
<u>R²</u>	0.066	0.087	0.097	0.077

Table B.5: Regression model on political engagement. Federal District and State of Mexico, 2010. (Linear regression, SUR Estimates)

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.

* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01

Table B.6: Correlates of the Location of Soriana Stores in 2012 in the Federal District and State of Mexico. _____

		Prox	imity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PRI 2006	-0.018^{+-} (0.008)	0.006 (0.009)	0.013 (0.009)	
PRD 2006	-0.007 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	0.014 (0.008)	
PAN 2006	0.0004 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)	
Turnout 2006	0.007** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.007 (0.004)	
Population Log			-0.055* (0.027)	-0.056* (0.027)
Population over 18			-0.239 (0.493)	-0.200 (0.489)
Population over 65			2.252** (0.700)	2.407*** (0.672)
Area			-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Density			-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)
Indigenous			0.216 (0.690)	0.121 (0.686)
Catholic			0.010 (0.304)	0.019 (0.304)
Non-religious			-0.873 (0.660)	-1.071 (0.654)
Education			0.012 (0.049)	0.011 (0.048)
College degree			-0.254 (0.498)	-0.096 (0.480)
Illiteracy			-2.500 (1.322)	-2.703* (1.311)
Inhabitants per house			-0.161 (0.107)	-0.140 (0.106)
Population in the labor market			1.478* (0.686)	1.390* (0.683)
Female population in the labor market			-1.010 (0.575)	-0.953 (0.572)
No insurance			-0.194 (0.210)	-0.221 (0.209)
Female head of household			0.742* (0.310)	0.686* (0.307)
Inhabitants per room			-0.285 (0.190)	-0.292 (0.189)
Dirt floor			0.188 (0.568)	0.199 (0.568)
All services			-0.053 (0.154)	-0.080 (0.153)
No services			0.567 (1.227)	0.575 (1.227)
Car			-1.035*** (0.257)	-0.950*** (0.254)
Mobile phone			0.463 (0.282)	0.432 (0.282)
Internet			0.521 (0.313)	0.557 (0.300)
Constant	0.663 (0.670)	-1.595* (0.792)	-0.864 (1.103)	0.813 (0.765)
Municipal dummies		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	10,716 0.015	10,716 0.047	10,715	10,715 0.054
Adjusted R ²	0.01517	0.037	0.043	0.043
χ^2	164.945^{*}	511.129^{***}	601.328^{***} (df = 132)	594.510^{***} (df = 128)
	(ar = 4)	(uI = 109)	(uI = 132)	(uI = 128)

Notes:

^{***}Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

C Individual Data Analysis

This section explores the individual characteristics of the handout recipients during the presidential election, using the the Mexico 2012 Panel Study (Greene et al., 2012). This analysis build on the previous work on the determinants for vote buying using the same data source. For instance, Palmer-Rubin and Nichter (2015) take advantage of a list experiment design in the survey and find that the PRD's weaker supporters were more likely to report receiving a gift during the presidential campaign. Complementing this finding, I check for the probability of an individual declaring that politicians often trade goods for votes in their community given the respondent's party affiliation and precinct's electoral support. Both models are tested using all the observations from the Panel Study and the sample of respondents from Mexico City and the State of Mexico.

Unlike the analysis proposed at the precinct level, I am unable to explore the interactive effects of distance, party support, and turnout given the relatively small number of precincts in the sample. Moreover, the fact that the question does not specify the type of handout makes me unable to identify whether voters refer to the gift cards or any other good. Therefore, the results of this analysis should be taken as an additional check for the qualitative evidence and as suggestive evidence that vote buying was more likely to occur in the PRD strongholds.

The results of this analysis are displayed in Table C.2. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the respondents living in Mexico City and the State of Mexico and Columns (3) and (4) replicate the results for all the observations in the survey. For each set of observations, I first consider the effects of observing vote-buying in their community using only individual-level variables, such as party identification and whether the respondent voted in the presidential election. Then I verify the consistency of the results using instead the aggregated variables—party stronghold and High Turnout—from the analysis in the paper. All the models include controls for the respondents' gender, urban residency, so-cioeconomic level, age, state, and proximity to *Soriana*. All models have clustered-standard

errors at the district levels.

The results show that PAN supporters were more likely to declare that handouts are often observed. In contrast, strong PRD supporters are more likely to respond that votebuying was more likely to happen in their communities. The results are statistically different from zero considering either all the observations or only the sample of respondents from the State of Mexico and Mexico City. Moreover, respondents living in precincts identified as stronghold for the PRD are also more likely to recognize that it is very likely to observe voters exchanging their votes for goods. The coefficient estimates for PRI supporters are not statistically significant in any model specification.

C.1 Variables

Dependent Variable

Vote Buying:

"Le voy a leer unas frases y quisiera que me diga si está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o totalmente en desacuerdo ... En mi comunidad, los políticos frecuentemente intentan comprar votos con regalos, favores o acceso a servicios " ["I am going to read some phrases and for each one, I want you to tell me if you agree completely, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree completely ... In my community, politicians often try to buy votes with gifts, favors, or access to services "]. (Agree completely/ Agree somewhat, Disagree somewhat/Disagree completely)

Independent Variables

Strong (*PAN/PRI/PRD*) *Identification*. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent strongly identified herself with any of the three political parties.

Weak (PAN/PRI/PRD) Identification. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent weakly identified herself with any of the three political parties.

Turnout. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent's voter ID has the mark for 2012 federal elections, indicating that the respondent indeed voted on election day.

Proximity. Inverted distance in kilometers between the precinct's centroid and the closest *Soriana* store.

(*PRI/PRD/PAN*) *Stronghold*. Indicator coded 1 if the party or coalition supporting the candidate got at least 50% of the votes in the precinct during the previous election.

High Mobilization. Indicator coded 1 if the turnout rate in the precinct during the previous election is at least one standard deviation above the state average rate.

Female. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent is female.

Age. Respondent's age.

Socioeconomic Level. Ordinal variable for the interviewer's classification of the respondent's neighborhood.

Rural. Indicator coded 1 if the respondent lives in a rural community.

C.2 Summary Statistics

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Vote Buying	1150	0.605	0.489	0	1
Weak PAN Supporter	1150	0.077		0	1
Strong PAN Supporter	1150	0.094		0	1
Weak PRI Supporter	1150	0.190		0	1
Strong PRI Supporter	1150	0.120		0	1
Weak PRD Supporter	1150	0.084		0	1
Strong PRD Supporter	1150	0.076		0	1
Proximity	1150	0.313		0.360	1.742
Female	1150	0.547	0.498	0	1
Age level	1150	5.357	3.060	1	12
Socioeconomic level	1147	1.501	0.673	1	3
Urban	1150	0.727	0.446	0	1
Turnout	1150	0.570	0.495	0	1
PRI Stronghold	1150	0.260	0.440	0	1
PAN Stronghold	1150	0.101	0.301	0	1
PRD Stronghold	1150	0.088	0.283	0	1
High Mobilization	1150	0.135	0.342	0	1

Table C.1: Summary Statistics

C.3 Results

	State of M	State of Mexico and		All Country	
	Mexic (1)	o City (2)	(3)	(4)	
Strong PAN Supporter	-2.344***	(2)	-0.699***	(1)	
Weak PAN Supporter	(0.643) -1.285^{*} (0.661)		(0.217) -0.368^{*} (0.216)		
Strong PRI Supporter	1.176 (0.811)		0.412 (0.272)		
Weak PRI Supporter	0.655 (0.589)		0.172 (0.227)		
Strong PRD Supporter	1.163* (0.668)		0.997** (0.357)		
Weak PRD Supporter	-0.365 (0.533)		-0.166 (0.299)		
Turnout	0.275 (0.853)		-0.260^{*} (0.145)		
Proximity	1.258 (0.854)	1.585 (0.672)	0.174 (0.531)	0.250 (0.498)	
PAN Stronghold		0.227 (0.738)		0.060 (0.358)	
PRI Stronghold		-0.972 (0.658)		-0.218 (0.325)	
PRD Stronghold		0.928** (0.450)		0.731* (0.386)	
High Turnout		-0.671 (0.672)		-0.396 (0.445)	
Female	0.193 (0.185)	0.201 (0.233)	-0.401^{**} (0.140)	-0.390** (0.139)	
Urban	0.199 (0.502)	0.239 (0.733)	-0.169 (0.337)	-0.124 (0.305)	
Socioeconomic Level	-0.395 (0.223)	-0.311 (0.218)	-0.306 (0.141)	-0.258 (0.129)	
Age	-0.057 (0.064)	-0.044 (0.050)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.021)	
State dummies N Log-likelihood	√ 273 −145.810	√ 273 −164.1298	1,133 -667.244	√ 1,136 -685.595	

Table C.2: Estimates for the Prevalence of Vote Buying at Individual Level. Data from the 2012 Mexican Panel

** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 **Significant at the 5 percent level.
 *Significant at the 10 percent level.

D Benchmark Results (Full Table)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity	-0.003	-0.003	0.030*	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.015)
PRI stronghold	-0.847**	-0.137	0.342	-0.651^{***}
	(0.270)	(0.307)	(0.188)	(0.185)
High Mobilization	-0.441	-0.061	0.208	-0.397
	(0.373)	(0.411)	(0.345)	(0.230)
PRD stronghold	-1.061^{***}	0.201	0.045	-0.896***
	(0.285)	(0.342)	(0.177)	(0.227)
PAN stronghold	1.680 ^{**}	-6.075^{***}	3.237***	-1.696^{***}
	(0.528)	(0.866)	(0.604)	(0.473)
PRI 2009	0.618*** (0.041)	-0.362^{***} (0.066)	-0.155^{***} (0.045)	0.072
PRD2009	-0.076^{*} (0.036)	0.405*** (0.074)	-0.136^{***} (0.036)	0.154*
PAN2009	0.090*	-0.492^{***} (0.084)	0.483***	0.053
Turnout 2009	-0.021	0.278*** (0.070)	0.065*	0.371***
Population Log	-0.170	0.122	0.051	-0.004
Population over 18	(0.117)	(0.143) 14.850***	(0.071) -7.995***	(0.119) 9.544***
Population over 65	(2.341)	(2.858)	(2.206)	(1.796)
	9.025***	-21.054***	19.808***	7.413*
Area	(2.434)	(4.068)	(3.138)	(3.629)
	0.065***		-0.007	0.029*
Density	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.013)
	-0.00000	0.00002**	-0.00002***	0.00001
Indianaus	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)
inaigenous	(3.947)	(3.809)	(2.064)	(3.190)
Catholic	-2.102	1.859	0.863	0.800
	(2.473)	(2.483)	(0.849)	(0.887)
Nonreligious	-10.745^{*} (4.214)	2.039 (3.300)	-4.345 (2.585)	-12.975*** (2.316)
Education	0.400*	-1.829^{***}	0.818**	-0.781***
	(0.194)	(0.299)	(0.281)	(0.228)
College degree	-9.270***	30.148***	-3.249	19.480***
	(1.854)	(3.213)	(2.297)	(2.548)
Illiteracy	2.232	-18.397***	9.918*	-5.578
	(5.613)	(5.229)	(5.005)	(3.895)
Inhabitants per house	1.307***	1.480 ^{**}	-1.022^{**}	1.854***
	(0.393)	(0.545)	(0.343)	(0.349)
Population in the labor market	3.103 (2.095)	-13.870^{**} (4.588)	7.942** (2.606)	-2.903 (2.835)
Female population in the labor market	-0.639	9.850**	-4.771*	4.714*
	(2.139)	(3.636)	(2.293)	(2.197)
No insurance	0.930 (0.938)	-0.260 (1.571)	-1.240 (0.837)	-0.654 (0.903)
Female head of household	3.657*** (1.088)	-1.164 (1.488)	-3.433*** (0.763)	-0.792 (0.845)
Inhabitants per room	-1.863* (0.847)	1.118 (1.211)	0.570	-0.156 (0.732)
Dirt floor	-1.948 (2.568)	-2.419 (2.451)	3.766* (1.894)	0.019 (1.562)

Table D.1: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Bench-

All services	-0.988	1.132	0.028	0.332
	(0.696)	(0.891)	(0.458)	(0.641)
No services	-3.704	3.715	9.500***	9.907*
	(4.182)	(5.373)	(2.870)	(4.824)
Car	-0.359	-0.359	3.885***	2.830 ^{***}
	(0.942)	(1.380)	(0.862)	(0.819)
Mobile phone	-0.053	-1.423	-0.809	-2.124
	(0.964)	(1.756)	(0.920)	(1.499)
Internet	2.066	-6.823***	7.897***	2.353*
	(1.056)	(1.329)	(1.131)	(1.191)
ACULCO	5.342***	-8.930***	1.610	-1.676
	(0.858)	(1.432)	(1.012)	(1.021)
ALMOLOYA DE JUAREZ	8.668***	-12.605^{***}	1.428**	-1.853**
	(0.581)	(0.529)	(0.485)	(0.576)
ALMOLOYA DEL RIO	10.927***	-7.317***	-3.341***	0.065
	(0.551)	(0.583)	(0.409)	(0.460)
AMANALCO	-0.446 (0.826)	-0.468 (1.062)	3.019*** (0.581)	1.707 (0.921)
AMECAMECA	-0.436 (0.306)	-0.617 (0.370)	-0.015 (0.221)	-1.332^{***} (0.233)
АРАХСО	2.146***	3.141**	-6.164^{***}	-1.433^{*}
	(0.485)	(1.102)	(0.828)	(0.567)
ATENCO	-3.122***	-0.677	3.137***	-1.058^{***}
	(0.339)	(0.405)	(0.198)	(0.194)
ATIZAPAN	6.765*** (0.574)	-0.004 (0.770)	-4.565^{***} (0.547)	2.559*** (0.514)
ATIZAPAN DE ZARAGOZA	-6.151^{***}	6.403***	-1.049	-0.994
	(0.495)	(1.133)	(0.881)	(0.527)
AXAPUSCO	11.477***	-7.378^{***}	3.992***	6.752***
	(0.934)	(1.277)	(1.030)	(0.851)
AYAPANGO	3.923***	-2.354***	-0.020	1.495***
	(0.356)	(0.358)	(0.213)	(0.245)
CALIMAYA	5.671*** (0.439)	-2.525^{**} (0.878)	-2.872^{***} (0.615)	0.685
CAPULHUAC	2.879***	-5.481^{***}	-3.939^{***}	-7.147^{***}
	(0.462)	(0.628)	(0.415)	(0.359)
CHALCO	-2.643^{***} (0.389)	(0.020) -1.780^{***} (0.452)	1.092** (0.357)	-3.498^{***} (0.275)
CHAPULTEPEC	1.989***	-2.649^{***}	2.034***	0.767*
	(0.378)	(0.616)	(0.392)	(0.378)
CHIAUTLA	3.576***	-4.204^{***}	2.409***	1.328***
	(0.311)	(0.420)	(0.211)	(0.242)
CHICOLOAPAN	(0.311) -1.598^{***} (0.346)	(0.420) -1.271^{**} (0.420)	-0.246	-3.274^{***}
CHICONCUAC	-6.012^{***} (0.370)	7.892*** (0.551)	-0.951^{**}	0.044
CHIMALHUACAN	-3.801***	0.923	0.142	-2.996^{***}
COACALCO DE BERRIOZABAL	-4.798*** (0.449)	2.154*** (0.654)	0.438	-2.245*** (0.284)
COCOTITLAN	-0.633	(0.05±) 8.077*** (0.481)	-3.958***	3.450***
COYOTEPEC	-5.403***	(0.481) 4.740*** (0.68)	-2.157***	-3.096*** (0.212)
CUAUTITLAN	(0.300) -4.599***	(0.008) 5.005*** (0.788)	(0.411) -1.388** (0.446)	(0.312) -1.089^{**}
CUAUTITLAN IZCALLI	(0.402)	(0.788) 8.572*** (1.010)	(0.446)	(0.304) -1.257*
ECATEPEC DE MORELOS	(0.480)	(1.019)	(0.509) -0.945*	(0.492) -1.714***
HUEHUETOCA	(0.464) -0.919	(0.644) 2.336*	(0.377)	(0.469) -1.895***

	(0.476)	(1.132)	(0.745)	(0.453)
HUEYPOXTLA	6.759*** (0.636)	-1.897^{*} (0.934)	-2.507*** (0.662)	2.091*** (0.544)
HUIXQUILUCAN	-4.424^{***}	5.290***	-0.839	-0.310
	(0.389)	(0.882)	(0.500)	(0.439)
ISIDRO FABELA	10.079***	-8.160^{***}	-1.317^{***}	0.988*
	(0.554)	(0.579)	(0.333)	(0.462)
IXTAPALUCA	-5.014^{***}	5.385***	-2.235***	-1.850^{***}
	(0.445)	(0.673)	(0.338)	(0.361)
IXTLAHUACA	10.349***	-6.298^{***}	-5.382^{***}	-0.587
	(0.723)	(1.086)	(0.590)	(0.833)
JALTENCO	1.710***	2.042***	-2.443^{***}	1.145***
	(0.378)	(0.599)	(0.388)	(0.343)
JILOTEPEC	-2.725^{***}	-7.590^{***}	7.847***	-1.755^{***}
	(0.325)	(0.470)	(0.398)	(0.298)
JILOTZINGO	4.558 ^{***}	-5.960^{***}	3.750***	2.361***
	(0.408)	(0.543)	(0.407)	(0.364)
JIQUIPILCO	7.649***	-10.029^{***}	-0.103	-2.155^{***}
	(0.531)	(0.629)	(0.342)	(0.594)
JOCOTITLAN	5.795***	-0.785	-4.358***	0.901
	(0.608)	(1.333)	(0.888)	(0.687)
JOQUICINGO	14.333***	-16.113^{***}	2.465***	1.691**
	(0.812)	(0.781)	(0.485)	(0.621)
JUCHITEPEC	0.164	-3.999***	5.402***	1.264^{***}
	(0.469)	(0.519)	(0.313)	(0.344)
LA PAZ	-4.748^{***}	3.179***	-0.768*	-2.535***
	(0.409)	(0.494)	(0.377)	(0.309)
LERMA	2.337***	-4.259^{***}	2.987***	0.921*
	(0.311)	(0.469)	(0.352)	(0.378)
MELCHOR OCAMPO	0.140	-1.403^{***}	-1.270^{**}	-2.923***
	(0.345)	(0.410)	(0.402)	(0.266)
METEPEC	-0.602	-0.955	-0.707	-1.972^{***}
	(0.359)	(0.879)	(0.431)	(0.374)
MEXICALTZINGO	0.679*	0.049	-3.717***	-3.427***
	(0.318)	(0.598)	(0.344)	(0.290)
MORELOS	4.100 ^{***}	-5.024^{***}	0.187	1.245
	(0.799)	(0.989)	(0.740)	(0.897)
NAUCALPAN DE JUAREZ	-5.710^{***}	5.877***	-0.563	-0.696
	(0.654)	(1.092)	(0.928)	(0.630)
NEXTLALPAN	6.758 ^{***}	-4.837^{***}	-1.007**	0.749*
	(0.437)	(0.542)	(0.384)	(0.315)
NEZAHUALCOYOTL	-4.013^{***}	5.231***	-1.411^{***}	-0.421
	(0.488)	(0.785)	(0.414)	(0.595)
NICOLAS ROMERO	-4.843^{***}	1.067	1.697***	-2.034***
	(0.394)	(0.581)	(0.369)	(0.387)
OCOYOACAC	7.683***	-8.181***	0.723*	0.768*
	(0.459)	(0.402)	(0.317)	(0.369)
OCUILAN	-3.360***	0.961	5.078***	2.779***
	(0.908)	(0.986)	(0.488)	(0.757)
OTUMBA	1.946**	3.176*	-1.988	3.144***
	(0.717)	(1.446)	(1.038)	(0.713)
OTZOLOTEPEC	3.052***	-2.804***	0.434	0.999**
	(0.377)	(0.360)	(0.269)	(0.357)
PAPALOTLA	-0.027	1.904**	0.338	1.371***
	(0.374)	(0.728)	(0.536)	(0.369)
POLOTITLAN	13.711***	-11.315***	-0.414	1.504*
	(0.554)	(0.919)	(0.614)	(0.585)
RAYON	10.431***	-8.156***	-0.423	1.775***
	(0.412)	(0.387)	(0.333)	(0.385)
SAN ANTONIO LA ISLA	2.396***	-4.904***	3.715***	0.654
	(0.423)	(0.512)	(0.449)	(0.375)

SAN FELIPE DEL PROGRESO	4.635***	-0.143	-4.290^{***}	0.693
	(1.295)	(2.059)	(0.922)	(1.442)
SAN MARTIN DE LAS PIRAMIDES	-3.079***	0.006	3.415***	-0.002
	(0.345)	(0.568)	(0.490)	(0.323)
SAN MATEO ATENCO	5.609***	0.196	-6.446^{***}	-0.356
	(0.441)	(1.001)	(0.649)	(0.479)
SOYANIQUILPAN DE JUAREZ	0.716	1.044	6.353***	7.065***
	(1.201)	(2.179)	(1.831)	(1.210)
TECAMAC	-3.469^{***}	8.382***	-4.465^{***}	0.284
	(0.453)	(1.225)	(0.827)	(0.468)
TEMAMATLA	-1.671^{***}	-7.768^{***}	6.373***	-3.444^{***}
	(0.292)	(0.443)	(0.304)	(0.298)
TEMASCALAPA	-2.054^{***}	1.888	1.864*	1.202*
	(0.541)	(1.007)	(0.760)	(0.496)
TEMOAYA	2.394***	-0.670	-1.337*	0.555
	(0.630)	(0.996)	(0.527)	(0.689)
TENANGO DEL AIRE	1.282***	-4.090^{***}	4.310***	1.230***
	(0.346)	(0.468)	(0.230)	(0.288)
TENANGO DEL VALLE	2.206***	-6.059^{***}	1.332***	-2.286***
	(0.410)	(0.478)	(0.334)	(0.362)
TEOLOYUCAN	-4.102^{***}	2.663***	-1.956***	-3.689***
	(0.229)	(0.474)	(0.309)	(0.208)
TEOTIHUACAN	-2.388^{***}	3.546***	-2.447***	-1.460^{***}
	(0.254)	(0.579)	(0.386)	(0.241)
TEPETLAOXTOC	2.458***	-1.706^{**}	2.152***	2.689***
	(0.507)	(0.648)	(0.352)	(0.651)
TEPOTZOTLAN	-6.438^{***}	8.416 ^{***}	-4.023^{***}	-2.436^{***}
	(0.410)	(1.068)	(0.710)	(0.471)
TEQUIXQUIAC	-3.544***	9.904***	-5.086***	0.640
	(0.635)	(1.493)	(1.097)	(0.618)
TEXCALYACAC	7.923***	-2.117^{***}	-5.145^{***}	1.101 ^{**}
	(0.468)	(0.453)	(0.361)	(0.382)
TEXCOCO	-9.504^{***}	5.877***	0.828**	-2.935^{***}
	(0.261)	(0.367)	(0.285)	(0.242)
TEZOYUCA	-0.717***	-5.108***	3.397***	-2.891***
	(0.217)	(0.249)	(0.153)	(0.154)
TIANGUISTENCO	1.806***	2.649**	-4.820^{***}	-0.083
	(0.504)	(0.875)	(0.548)	(0.460)
TLALMANALCO	1.089***	-1.039**	-2.116^{***}	-1.649^{***}
	(0.324)	(0.364)	(0.248)	(0.282)
TLALNEPANTLA DE BAZ	-5.028***	7.568***	-3.125***	-0.745
	(0.657)	(1.024)	(0.736)	(0.540)
TOLUCA	-2.538***	2.004	-1.282*	-1.685**
	(0.528)	(1.133)	(0.571)	(0.544)
TONANITLA	1.632	1.184	-3.908***	-1.793*
	(1.392)	(0.712)	(1.098)	(0.802)
TULTEPEC	0.298	-1.184**	-0.786*	-1.732***
	(0.324)	(0.403)	(0.318)	(0.252)
TULTITLAN	-2.507***	0.303	0.288	-1.907^{***}
	(0.600)	(0.766)	(0.346)	(0.395)
VALLE DE CHALCO SOLIDARIDAD	-2.817***	-0.785	0.778	-3.102***
	(0.455)	(0.572)	(0.440)	(0.332)
VILLA DE ALLEND	4.325***	1.668	-0.871	5.619***
	(0.809)	(0.901)	(0.712)	(0.876)
VILLA DEL CARBON	4.661***	-6.856***	-0.183	-2.214*
	(0.919)	(0.937)	(0.566)	(1.007)
VILLA VICTORIA	1.197 (0.845)	-0.880 (1.568)	3.882*** (1.159)	3.873*** (0.892)
XALATLACO	-2.938***	2.830**	-3.374***	-3.955***
	(0.642)	(0.959)	(0.548)	(0.526)
XONACATLAN	-3.699***	3.654***	0.720*	0.374
	(0.359)	(0.513)	(0.359)	(0.368)

ZUMPANGO ALVARO OBREGON AZCAPOTZALCO BENITO JUAREZ COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA	$\begin{array}{c} -0.024 \\ (0.531) \\ -6.251^{***} \\ (0.578) \\ -5.637^{***} \\ (0.580) \\ -5.039^{***} \\ (0.640) \\ -5.640^{***} \\ (0.857) \\ -1.180^{*} \\ (0.527) \\ -4.327^{***} \\ (0.647) \\ -5.449^{***} \\ (0.666) \\ -5.532^{***} \\ (0.572) \\ -5.443^{***} \\ (0.617) \\ -5.168^{***} \end{array}$	8.173^{***} (1.191) 9.523^{***} (0.631) 8.549^{***} (0.632) 8.396^{***} (0.866) 11.173^{***} (1.348) 4.264^{***} (0.676) 6.945^{***} (0.6705) 9.032^{***} (0.703) 9.970^{***} (0.625) 8.195^{***} (0.750)	$\begin{array}{c} -7.962^{***}\\ (0.887)\\ -0.323\\ (0.654)\\ -1.683^{**}\\ (0.518)\\ -1.910^{**}\\ (0.662)\\ -3.515^{***}\\ (0.608)\\ -3.411^{***}\\ (0.579)\\ -1.863^{**}\\ (0.599)\\ -2.043^{***}\\ (0.552)\\ -2.126^{***}\\ (0.541)\\ -2.069^{***}\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.108\\ (0.551)\\ \textbf{2.844}^{***}\\ (0.619)\\ 0.960\\ (0.567)\\ \textbf{1.225}^*\\ (0.624)\\ \textbf{1.708}^*\\ (0.711)\\ -0.638\\ (0.491)\\ 0.447\\ (0.598)\\ \textbf{1.291}^*\\ (0.646)\\ \textbf{2.113}^{***}\\ (0.567)\end{array}$
ALVARO OBREGON AZCAPOTZALCO BENITO JUAREZ COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	$\begin{array}{c} -6.251^{***}\\ (0.578)\\ -5.637^{***}\\ (0.580)\\ -5.039^{***}\\ (0.640)\\ -5.640^{***}\\ (0.857)\\ -1.180^{*}\\ (0.527)\\ -4.327^{***}\\ (0.647)\\ -5.449^{***}\\ (0.666)\\ -5.532^{***}\\ (0.572)\\ -5.443^{***}\\ (0.617)\\ -5.168^{***}\\ \end{array}$	9.523^{***} (0.631) 8.549^{***} (0.632) 8.396^{***} (0.866) 11.173^{***} (1.348) 4.264^{***} (0.676) 6.945^{***} (0.705) 9.032^{***} (0.703) 9.970^{***} (0.625) 8.195^{***} (0.750)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.323\\ (0.654)\\ -1.683^{**}\\ (0.518)\\ -1.910^{**}\\ (0.662)\\ -3.515^{***}\\ (0.608)\\ -3.411^{***}\\ (0.579)\\ -1.863^{**}\\ (0.599)\\ -2.043^{***}\\ (0.552)\\ -2.126^{***}\\ (0.541)\\ -2.069^{***}\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 2.844^{***}\\ (0.619)\\ 0.960\\ (0.567)\\ 1.225^{*}\\ (0.624)\\ 1.708^{*}\\ (0.711)\\ -0.638\\ (0.491)\\ 0.447\\ (0.598)\\ 1.291^{*}\\ (0.646)\\ 2.113^{***}\\ (0.567)\end{array}$
AZCAPOTZALCO BENITO JUAREZ COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTACALCO	(0.578) $-5.637^{***}(0.580)$ $-5.039^{***}(0.640)$ $-5.640^{***}(0.857)$ $-1.180^{*}(0.527)$ $-4.327^{***}(0.647)$ $-5.449^{***}(0.666)$ $-5.532^{***}(0.572)$ $-5.443^{***}(0.617)$ -5.168^{***}	(0.631) 8.549^{***} (0.632) 8.396^{***} (0.866) 11.173^{***} (1.348) 4.264^{***} (0.676) 6.945^{***} (0.705) 9.032^{***} (0.703) 9.970^{***} (0.625) 8.195^{***} (0.750)	(0.654) -1.683^{**} (0.518) -1.910^{**} (0.662) -3.515^{***} (0.608) -3.411^{***} (0.579) -1.863^{**} (0.599) -2.043^{***} (0.552) -2.126^{***} (0.541) -2.069^{***}	(0.619) 0.960 (0.567) $1.225*$ (0.624) $1.708*$ (0.711) -0.638 (0.491) 0.447 (0.598) $1.291*$ (0.646) $2.113****$ (0.567)
BENITO JUAREZ COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	$\begin{array}{c} (0.580) \\ -5.039^{***} \\ (0.640) \\ -5.640^{***} \\ (0.857) \\ -1.180^{*} \\ (0.527) \\ -4.327^{***} \\ (0.647) \\ -5.449^{***} \\ (0.666) \\ -5.532^{***} \\ (0.572) \\ -5.443^{***} \\ (0.617) \\ -5.168^{***} \end{array}$	(0.632) $8.396^{***}(0.866)$ $11.173^{***}(1.348)$ $4.264^{***}(0.676)$ $6.945^{***}(0.705)$ $9.032^{***}(0.703)$ $9.970^{***}(0.625)$ $8.195^{***}(0.750)$	(0.518) -1.910^{**} (0.662) -3.515^{***} (0.608) -3.411^{***} (0.579) -1.863^{**} (0.599) -2.043^{***} (0.552) -2.126^{***} (0.541) -2.069^{***}	(0.567) 1.225^{*} (0.624) 1.708^{*} (0.711) -0.638 (0.491) 0.447 (0.598) 1.291^{*} (0.646) 2.113^{***} (0.567)
BENITO JUAREZ COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	$\begin{array}{c} -5.039^{***}\\ (0.640) \\ \\ -5.640^{***}\\ (0.857) \\ \\ -1.180^{*}\\ (0.527) \\ \\ -4.327^{***}\\ (0.647) \\ \\ -5.449^{***}\\ (0.666) \\ \\ -5.532^{***}\\ (0.572) \\ \\ -5.443^{***}\\ (0.617) \\ \\ -5.168^{***} \end{array}$	8.396^{***} (0.866) 11.173*** (1.348) 4.264*** (0.676) 6.945*** (0.705) 9.032*** (0.703) 9.970*** (0.625) 8.195*** (0.750)	$\begin{array}{c} -1.910^{**} \\ (0.662) \\ -3.515^{***} \\ (0.608) \\ -3.411^{***} \\ (0.579) \\ -1.863^{**} \\ (0.599) \\ -2.043^{***} \\ (0.552) \\ -2.126^{***} \\ (0.541) \\ -2.069^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.225^{*} \\ (0.624) \\ 1.708^{*} \\ (0.711) \\ -0.638 \\ (0.491) \\ 0.447 \\ (0.598) \\ 1.291^{*} \\ (0.646) \\ 2.113^{***} \\ (0.567) \end{array}$
COYOACAN CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-5.640^{***} (0.857) -1.180^{*} (0.527) -4.327^{***} (0.647) -5.449^{***} (0.666) -5.532^{***} (0.572) -5.443^{***} (0.617) -5.168^{***}	$\begin{array}{c} 11.173^{***}\\ (1.348)\\ 4.264^{***}\\ (0.676)\\ 6.945^{***}\\ (0.705)\\ 9.032^{***}\\ (0.703)\\ 9.970^{***}\\ (0.625)\\ 8.195^{***}\\ (0.750)\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -3.515^{***}\\ (0.608)\\ -3.411^{***}\\ (0.579)\\ -1.863^{**}\\ (0.599)\\ -2.043^{***}\\ (0.552)\\ -2.126^{***}\\ (0.541)\\ -2.069^{***}\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.708^{*} \\ (0.711) \\ -0.638 \\ (0.491) \\ 0.447 \\ (0.598) \\ 1.291^{*} \\ (0.646) \\ 2.113^{***} \\ (0.567) \end{array}$
CUAJIMALPA DE MORELOS CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-1.180^{*} (0.527) -4.327^{***} (0.647) -5.449^{***} (0.666) -5.532^{***} (0.572) -5.443^{***} (0.617) -5.168^{***}	$\begin{array}{c} 4.264^{***}\\ (0.676)\\ 6.945^{***}\\ (0.705)\\ 9.032^{***}\\ (0.703)\\ 9.970^{***}\\ (0.625)\\ 8.195^{***}\\ (0.750)\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -3.411^{***} \\ (0.579) \\ -1.863^{**} \\ (0.599) \\ -2.043^{***} \\ (0.552) \\ -2.126^{***} \\ (0.541) \\ -2.069^{***} \end{array}$	-0.638 (0.491) 0.447 (0.598) 1.291* (0.646) 2.113*** (0.567)
CUAUHTEMOC GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-4.327^{***} (0.647) -5.449^{***} (0.666) -5.532^{***} (0.572) -5.443^{***} (0.617) -5.168^{***}	6.945^{***} (0.705) 9.032^{***} (0.703) 9.970^{***} (0.625) 8.195^{***} (0.750)	$\begin{array}{c} -1.863^{**}\\ (0.599)\\ -2.043^{***}\\ (0.552)\\ -2.126^{***}\\ (0.541)\\ -2.069^{***}\end{array}$	0.447 (0.598) 1.291* (0.646) 2.113*** (0.567)
GUSTAVO A. MADERO IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	(0.64/) -5.449*** (0.666) -5.532*** (0.572) -5.443*** (0.617) -5.168***	$\begin{array}{c} (0.705) \\ 9.032^{***} \\ (0.703) \\ 9.970^{***} \\ (0.625) \\ 8.195^{***} \\ (0.750) \end{array}$	(0.599) -2.043^{***} (0.552) -2.126^{***} (0.541) -2.069^{***}	(0.598) 1.291* (0.646) 2.113*** (0.567)
IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-5.32*** (0.666) -5.532*** (0.572) -5.443*** (0.617) -5.168***	$9.032^{-0.00}$ (0.703) 9.970^{***} (0.625) 8.195^{***} (0.750)	$\begin{array}{c} -2.043 \\ (0.552) \\ -2.126^{***} \\ (0.541) \\ -2.069^{***} \end{array}$	1.291 (0.646) 2.113*** (0.567)
IZTACALCO IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-5.532*** (0.572) -5.443*** (0.617) -5.168***	9.970*** (0.625) 8.195*** (0.750)	-2.126^{***} (0.541) -2.069^{***}	2.113*** (0.567)
IZTAPALAPA MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-5.443*** (0.617) -5.168***	8.195*** (0.750)	-2.069***	. ,
MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	(0.617)	(0.750)	(0 524)	0.323
MAGDALENA CONTRERAS	-5.168	10.000***	(0.524)	(0.598)
	(0.566)	(0.602)	(0.522)	(0.525)
MIGUEL HIDALGO	-3.436*** (0.565)	5.809*** (0.730)	-2.134*** (0.593)	-0.061 (0.590)
MILPA ALTA	-5.996^{***} (0.514)	9.815 ^{***} (0.545)	-3.350^{***} (0.416)	-0.168 (0.483)
TLAHUAC	-4.802***	11.668***	-3.723***	2.806***
TT 41 DAN	(0.560)	(0.663)	(0.506)	(0.585)
ILALPAN	(0.557)	(0.839)	(0.556)	(0.694)
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA	-3.495*** (0.674)	6.429*** (0.696)	-2.022*** (0.536)	0.718 (0.566)
XOCHIMILCO	-4.921***	10.886***	-3.200***	2.319***
	(0.609)	(0.612)	(0.564)	(0.575)
Proximity $ imes$ PRI stronghold	0.150 (0.159)	-0.003 (0.160)	0.034 (0.118)	0.117 (0.149)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold	0.469* (0.202)	-0.283 (0.215)	-0.014 (0.100)	0.162 (0.194)
Proximity \times PAN stronghold	-0.850^{**}	1.237***	-0.014	0.450*
Provimity V High Mobilization	(0.264)	0.046	(0.268)	(0.213)
rioxinity × riigi Mobilization	(0.207)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.078)
Proximity × PRI stronghold ×High Mobilization	-0.134 (0.295)	0.048 (0.214)	-0.087 (0.160)	-0.120 (0.189)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold \times High Mobilization	29.390* (12.655)	-20.630** (7.236)	1.111 (8.331)	7.207 (9.616)
Proximity × PAN stronghold × High Mobilization	-2.031	-5.810^{***} (0.658)	4.707*	-3.707**
Constant	16.156***	10.229	2.892	31.385***
N	(4.218)	(7.910)	(2.833)	(4.691)
R ²	0.873	0.866	10,567 0.910	10,567 0.811

Table D.2: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.087	-0.005	-0.053	-0.167
-	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.096)
PRD Stronghold	29.757	-20.962	1.097	7.204
U	(12.704)	(7.207)	(8.330)	(9.612)
PAN Stronghold	-2.984	-4.622	4.693	-3.422
	(1.870)	(0.680)	(2.084)	(1.208)



Notes: The plot shows the marginal effects of the PRI and PAN mobilized strongholds for the candidates' vote shares at different levels of *Proximity* to the Soriana stores. The figure is based on the estimates reported in Table 1. Solid lines depicts the point estimate, and the Figure D.1: Marginal Effect of Mobilized PRI and PAN Strongholds on Vote Shares by Proximity to the Soriana Stores. color areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

E Robustness Checks

I test the analysis under alternative specifications for the model. Table E.2 shows the results when the dependent variable for the vote shares considers the proportion votes cast during the election that go to each candidate. Table E.4 uses as dependent variable the percent change in the parties' vote shares and turnout rates between 2009 and 2012 as dependent variables. Table E.6 explores the persistence of the effects when store proximity is measured using driving distance rather than linear distance. To create this alternative code, I use the road information from the *Bing*'s API to build proximity network and estimate the shortest path length between every precinct's centroid and the *Soriana* stores. Finally, to test the persistence of the results under alternative codings for strongholds, Tables E.7 to E.10 show the results when coding party strongholds as (1) precincts with a vote share for a given party with a value at least one standard deviation above the observed mean or (2) a vote share equal or higher than 45%.

Moreover, I test the sensitivity of the results to three alternative models. First, Table E.12 presents a model interacting *Proximity* with every independent variable. Second, Table E.14 shows the estimates when each dependent variable $y_{i,m}^j$ is logistically transformed to $ln(\frac{y_{i,m}^j}{1-y_{i,m}^j})$. Finally, Table E.17 shows the results of the analysis using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Zellner, 1962). The effects hold in these three cases.

Table E.1: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election Using as Dependent Variable the Proportion of Votes to Each of the Candidates.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota
PRI Stronghold	-0.020	0.065	-0.021
-	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.066)
PRD Stronghold	36.173	-32.573	0.868
	(16.187)	(7.584)	(12.890)
PAN Stronghold	-2.298	-3.507	6.263
	(2.553)	(1.248)	(2.561)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Proximity	-0.019	-0.019	0.043**
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.017)
PRI stronghold	-0.244	-0.204	0.398
	(0.391)	(0.502)	(0.229)
High Mobilization	-0.936^{*}	0.896	0.186
	(0.465)	(0.604)	(0.488)
PRD stronghold	-2.054***	2.495***	-0.353
	(0.479)	(0.669)	(0.308)
PAN stronghold	3.111 ^{***}	-7.745^{***}	5.311***
	(0.868)	(1.240)	(0.802)
PRI 2009	0.893***	-0.685^{***}	-0.158 ^{**}
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.056)
PRD2009	-0.180^{*} (0.073)	0.431*** (0.090)	-0.181^{***} (0.051)
PAN2009	0.130	-0.824^{***}	0.739***
	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.074)
Turnout 2009	-0.223***	0.244**	-0.073
	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.041)
Population Log	-0.141	0.287	-0.143
	(0.166)	(0.223)	(0.161)
Population over 18	-1.517	14.249***	-12.945***
	(3.712)	(4.069)	(3.247)
Population over 65	12.270**	-34.580 ^{***}	23.227***
	(4.173)	(5.675)	(5.104)
Area	0.071**	-0.057^{*}	-0.011
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.014)
Density	-0.00001	0.00004**	-0.00003***
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Indigenous	1.446	-6.375	5.652
	(4.506)	(4.958)	(3.627)
Catholic	-3.753	2.463	1.085
	(3.566)	(3.884)	(1.373)
Nonreligious	-8.828	6.951	1.006
	(6.161)	(4.833)	(4.757)
Education	1.144***	-2.033^{***}	1.084**
	(0.318)	(0.451)	(0.367)
College degree	-24.361***	30.503***	-7.641**
	(3.166)	(4.331)	(2.574)
Illiteracy	9.122	-23.658**	12.672
	(7.510)	(7.832)	(7.452)
Inhabitants per house	1.031	1.303	-2.361^{***}
	(0.628)	(0.761)	(0.590)
Population in the labor market	6.538*	-18.079**	11.439*
	(3.152)	(6.327)	(5.040)
Female population in the labor market	-4.504	14.247**	-9.799*
	(3.519)	(5.179)	(4.113)
No insurance	2.407	0.457	-2.813
	(1.497)	(2.281)	(1.577)
Female head of household	6.853*** (1.725)	-1.611 (2.202)	-5.536*** (1.220)
Inhabitants per room	-1.842 (1.482)	2.255 (1.825)	-0.516 (0.982)
Dirt floor	-1.092	-3.876	3.921
	(3.864)	(4.145)	(2.644)
All services	-1.790	1.654	-0.109
	(0.981)	(1.121)	(0.828)
No services	-12.821*	0.987	11.945*
	(6.112)	(7.091)	(5.025)

Table E.2: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election Using
as Dependent Variable the Proportion of Votes to Each of the Candidates.

Car	-2.065	-1.831	4.547***
	(1.435)	(1.940)	(1.350)
Mobile phone	1.617	-1.260	-0.719
I	(1.349)	(2.529)	(1.949)
Internet	2,506	-11.119***	9.864***
	(1.464)	(2.005)	(1.562)
Proximity \times PRI stronghold	-0.015	0.125	-0.001
, ,	(0.235)	(0.284)	(0.147)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold	0.896**	-1.037**	0.160
, 0	(0.300)	(0.355)	(0.206)
Proximity \times PAN stronghold	-1.483***	1.852***	-0.459
	(0.412)	(0.326)	(0.346)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PRI stronghold	-2.138***	1.414	0.786
	(0.596)	(0.765)	(0.489)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PRD stronghold	2.477	-6.520***	3.199*
	(1.847)	(1.778)	(1.500)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PAN stronghold	-2.575	11.230***	-8.852***
	(1.852)	(1.191)	(2.176)
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.001	0.054	-0.049
	(0.264)	(0.190)	(0.128)
Proximity \times PRI stronghold \times	0.015	-0.095	-0.014
High Mobilization	(0.399)	(0.365)	(0.207)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold \times	35.298*	-31.571***	0.714
High Mobilization	(16.121)	(7.612)	(12.893)
Proximity \times PAN stronghold \times	-0.795	-5.394***	6.727**
High Mobilization	(2.517)	(1.214)	(2.624)
Constant	37.662***	35.035**	22.298**
	(6.876)	(12.883)	(7.762)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N P ²	10,567	10,567	10,567
к ⁻ F-Statistic (df = 147)	0.874 497.6***	0.897 629.2***	0.893 602.4 ^{***}
Notes:		***Signifi	icant at the 0.1 percent leve

* Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.3: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election Using as Dependent Variable the Change in the Vote Shares for the Political Parties Between 2009 and 2012.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.029	-0.002	0.018	0.004
-	(0.080)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.053)
PRD Stronghold	32.166	-29.444	-2.661	7.547
U U	(11.547)	(8.562)	(8.485)	(11.867)
PAN Stronghold	-2.163	-4.113	7.577	0.378
0	(1.630)	(0.763)	(2.097)	(1.929)
	inge in the Tote Shares for a	ine i onneur i urueo between	2009 und 2012.	
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	Δ PRI vote share (2009-2012) (1)	△ PRD vote share (2009-2012) (2)	Δ PAN (2009-2012) (3)	Δ Turnout (4)
Proximity	0.002 (0.015)	0.013 (0.025)	0.024 (0.014)	0.014 (0.021)
PRI stronghold	-2.991***	0.321	0.484*	-1.560^{***}
	(0.328)	(0.341)	(0.209)	(0.265)
High Mobilization	-1.699^{***}	-1.159^{**}	-1.313*	-4.886***
	(0.389)	(0.414)	(0.512)	(0.528)
PRD stronghold	-0.253	-0.542	0.558**	0.288
	(0.283)	(0.326)	(0.178)	(0.258)
PAN stronghold	3.801***	-6.220^{***}	1.315*	-0.127
	(0.589)	(0.668)	(0.589)	(0.594)
Population Log	0.206	0.229	0.174*	0.629***
	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.084)	(0.113)
Population over 18	-0.105	14.081***	-6.411**	7.302***
	(2.159)	(2.879)	(2.073)	(1.959)
Population over 65	14.316***	-23.354***	6.858*	-5.889
	(2.289)	(4.027)	(2.945)	(3.442)
Area	0.052**	-0.035	-0.020	0.002
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Density	-0.00000	0.00003**	-0.00001	0.00001
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Indigenous	-6.387	-3.160	4.309	-4.844
	(5.246)	(4.328)	(2.413)	(2.879)
Catholic	-3.089	-0.066	-2.523**	-4.811**
	(2.372)	(2.285)	(0.804)	(1.549)
Nonreligious	-7.763	3.277	-6.587*	-13.363***
	(3.961)	(3.338)	(2.962)	(3.170)
Education	0.729***	-1.709***	0.377	-0.937***
	(0.187)	(0.290)	(0.236)	(0.253)
College degree	-12.769***	29.464***	0.326	14.232***
	(1.802)	(3.237)	(2.012)	(2.955)
Illiteracy	6.532	-14.033*	3.981	-11.626*
	(5.460)	(6.485)	(4.395)	(5.184)
Inhabitants per house	0.674	1.010	-0.618	0.838
	(0.392)	(0.547)	(0.387)	(0.446)
Population in the labor market	4.612* (2.220)	-12.865^{**} (4.422)	4.958 (2.636)	-1.702 (2.702)
Female population in the labor market	-1.032	10.464**	-1.485	6.361*
	(2.101)	(3.464)	(2.662)	(2.494)
No insurance	1.914	0.331	-1.186	1.958*
	(0.979)	(1.427)	(1.001)	(0.926)
Female head of household	2.300*	-0.610	-2.375***	-1.272
	(1.145)	(1.369)	(0.721)	(1.021)
Inhabitants per room	-1.253	0.967	0.976	0.530
	(1.003)	(1.183)	(0.630)	(0.914)
Dirt floor	-2.752	-3.722	2.234	-3.240
	(2.837)	(2.465)	(2.040)	(2.214)
All services	-0.493	1.432	0.854	2.332***
	(0.708)	(0.870)	(0.520)	(0.582)
No services	-2.946 (4.263)	3.839 (5.877)	11.431*** (3.161)	13.664* (5.650)
Car	-0.694	-1.163	1.679	-0.817
	(0.969)	(1.335)	(0.888)	(1.022)
Mobile phone	0.062	-1.591	-0.666	0.914
	(1.089)	(1.699)	(1.117)	(1.304)
Internet	4.412***	-6.003^{***}	4.234***	1.275
	(1.173)	(1.500)	(1.247)	(1.782)
Proximity \times PRI stronghold	0.218	-0.089	0.044	0.105

Table E.4: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election U	Jsing
as Dependent Variable the Change in the Vote Shares for the Political Parties Between 2009 and 2012.	

	(0.201)	(0.163)	(0.138)	(0.176)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold	0.244	-0.690^{***}	-0.183	-0.443^{**}
	(0.204)	(0.194)	(0.101)	(0.139)
Proximity \times PAN stronghold	-0.884**	1.121***	0.090	0.110
	(0.277)	(0.263)	(0.344)	(0.285)
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.025	0.128	0.269	0.241
	(0.188)	(0.199)	(0.231)	(0.152)
High Mobilization \times PRI stronghold	-1.801**	1.002	1.326**	0.853
	(0.577)	(0.522)	(0.418)	(0.442)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PRD stronghold	0.135	-4.415**	2.713*	-1.678
с с	(1.309)	(1.531)	(1.068)	(1.646)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PAN stronghold	0.090	8.214***	-7.259***	0.307
0 0	(1.005)	(0.918)	(1.978)	(1.390)
Proximity \times PRI stronghold \times	-0.223	-0.055	-0.318	-0.356
High Mobilization	(0.326)	(0.275)	(0.253)	(0.197)
Proximity \times PRD stronghold \times	31.945**	-28.895***	-2.771	7.735
High Mobilization	(11.500)	(8.608)	(8.486)	(11.875)
Proximity \times PAN stronghold \times	-1.256	-5.376***	7.195***	0.013
High Mobilization	(1.553)	(0.729)	(2.092)	(1.980)
Constant	0.937	1.970	1.529	4.863
	(4.824)	(6.480)	(2.557)	(2.964)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.596	0.802	0.623	0.788
F-Statistic	109.3***	298.5***	122.1***	274.6***
Notes:		***	Significant at the 0.	1 percent level.
		*	* Significant at the	1 percent level.
			Significant at the	o percent level.

Table E.5: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election Using an Alternative Specification for *Proximity*.

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	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.009	0.006	0.006	-0.011
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
PRD Stronghold	49.939	-47.396	6.883	4.487
U U	(15.148)	(25.959)	(19.914)	(12.792)
PAN Stronghold	-2.777	-0.700	4.280	-7.330
	(4.976)	(4.262)	(6.793)	(3.745)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Driving Proximity	-0.017** (0.006)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.024** (0.009)	0.005* (0.002)
PRI stronghold	-0.308	-0.115	0.357	-0.601**
	(0.382)	(0.487)	(0.232)	(0.187)
High Mobilization	-0.993*	0.934	0.208	-0.491^{*}
	(0.451)	(0.590)	(0.483)	(0.213)
PRD stronghold	-2.021*** (0.525)	2.565*** (0.741)	-0.467 (0.348)	-1.060*** (0.239)
PAN stronghold	3.670***	-8.454^{***}	5.501***	-1.745***
	(0.881)	(1.225)	(0.849)	(0.501)
PRI 2009	0.896 ^{***}	-0.686^{***}	-0.160^{**}	0.072
	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.056)	(0.069)
PRD 2009	-0.176^{*}	0.428 ^{***}	-0.182***	0.154*
	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.067)
PAN 2009	0.133	-0.823^{***}	0.736***	0.055
	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.074)	(0.072)
Turnout 2009	-0.224^{***}	0.244**	-0.072	0.372***
	(0.068)	(0.079)	(0.041)	(0.067)
Population Log	-0.139 (0.166)	0.286 (0.224)	-0.145 (0.161)	-0.005 (0.119)
Population over 18	-1.680	14.630***	-13.188***	9.589***
	(3.723)	(4.038)	(3.304)	(1.807)
Population over 65	12.556**	-35.306***	23.709***	7.194*
	(4.168)	(5.721)	(5.218)	(3.655)
Area	0.071**	-0.058*	-0.010 (0.014)	0.030*
Density	-0.00000 (0.00001)	0.00003** (0.00001)	-0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00001
Indigenous	1.256	-6.124	5.556	-8.583**
	(4.555)	(4.955)	(3.604)	(3.220)
Catholic	-3.749	2.432	1.107	0.753
	(3.566)	(3.883)	(1.378)	(0.891)
Nonreligious	-8.667	6.771	1.042	-13.031***
	(6.103)	(4.834)	(4.773)	(2.320)
Education	1.141***	-2.020***	1.072**	-0.769^{***}
	(0.318)	(0.454)	(0.369)	(0.225)
College degree	-24.381^{***}	30.469***	-7.557**	19.378***
	(3.142)	(4.314)	(2.599)	(2.517)
Illiteracy	9.272	-23.810^{**}	12.697	-5.561
	(7.556)	(7.815)	(7.484)	(3.902)
Inhabitants per house	1.023	1.328	-2.378^{***}	1.864***
	(0.625)	(0.765)	(0.591)	(0.349)
Population in the labor market	6.646*	-18.348^{**}	11.618*	-2.899
	(3.153)	(6.383)	(5.090)	(2.845)
Female population in the labor market	-4.498	14.377**	-9.952*	4.638*
	(3.528)	(5.208)	(4.148)	(2.199)
No insurance	2.388	0.524	-2.868 (1.583)	-0.640 (0.899)
Female head of household	6.832***	(-1.621)	-5.504***	-0.797
	(1.733)	(2.209)	(1.232)	(0.843)
Inhabitants per room	-1.853 (1.478)	2.295	-0.543	-0.204 (0.737)
Dirt floor	-1.051	-4.037	4.046	0.010
All services	-1.814	1.699	-0.131	0.307
No services	-12.947* (6.226)	1.328	(0.000) 11.733* (5.045)	9.877* (4.818)

Table E.6: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores or	Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Alter-
native Specifications for Proximity.	

Car	-2.021	-1.901	4.578***	2.785***
	(1.435)	(1.941)	(1.346)	(0.817)
Mobile phone	1.613	-1.262	-0.706	-2.127
	(1.352)	(2.541)	(1.953)	(1.506)
Internet	2.455	-11.113***	9.906***	2.340*
	(1.450)	(1.963)	(1.546)	(1.179)
Driving Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	0.159	-0.046	0.123	0.047
	(0.410)	(0.456)	(0.279)	(0.344)
Driving Proximity × High Mobilization	0.064***	-0.024	-0.046***	-0.025***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.005)
PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-2.042***	1.315	0.808	1.217***
0 0	(0.569)	(0.729)	(0.480)	(0.294)
Driving Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	1.474	-2.141	0.741	0.915*
0 , 0	(0.929)	(1.248)	(0.581)	(0.440)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PRD Stronghold	2.793	-6.735**	2.940*	-0.203
0 0	(1.443)	(2.271)	(1.458)	(1.607)
Driving Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-4.575***	5.802***	-1.525	1.022
	(1.102)	(1.275)	(1.177)	(0.665)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PAN Stronghold	-3.520	10.442***	-7.132*	3.721***
	(2.065)	(1.630)	(2.991)	(0.892)
Driving Proximity × PRI Stronghold	-0.215	0.080	-0.095	-0.038
× High Mobilization	(0.412)	(0.459)	(0.280)	(0.344)
Driving Proximity × PRD Stronghold	48.418**	-45.226	6.164	3.593
× High Mobilization	(15.230)	(26.008)	(19.929)	(12.847)
Driving Proximity × PAN Stronghold	1.751	-6.474	5.826	-8.333*
imes High Mobilization	(5.049)	(4.700)	(6.834)	(3.579)
Constant	37.667***	34.777**	22.565**	31.467***
	(6.948)	(13.019)	(7.780)	(4.722)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N ₂	10,550	10,550	10,550	10,550
R ²	0.873	0.897	0.894	0.811
F-statistic (df=147)	494.1	627.9	604	308.6
Notes:			* * * Significant at th	e 0.1 percent level.

**Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.7: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Alternative Specification of Party Strongholds.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	0.018	-0.128	-0.029	-0.161
-	(1.240)	(1.019)	(0.937)	(0.865)
PRD Stronghold	5.582	-2.953	-2.365	-0.175
0	(1.411)	(1.246)	(1.100)	(1.051)
PAN Stronghold	-1.231	-0.344	0.951	-0.743
0	(0.634)	(0.532)	(0.510)	(0.452)

	Peña Nieto vote share (1)	López Obrador vote share (2)	Vázquez Mota vote share (3)	Turnout (4)
Proximity	0.017 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.041)	0.015 (0.029)	0.011 (0.028)
PRI stronghold	-0.543** (0.207)	-0.338 (0.186)	0.447** (0.138)	-0.482*** (0.136)
High Mobilization	-0.524 (0.371)	-0.329 (0.276)	0.333 (0.210)	-0.608^{**} (0.195)
PRD stronghold	-0.434^{**} (0.141)	0.028 (0.138)	-0.007 (0.097)	-0.539^{***} (0.148)
PAN stronghold	-0.095 (0.150)	-0.846^{***} (0.233)	0.543** (0.178)	-0.442^{*} (0.179)
PRI 2009	0.425*** (0.039)	-0.176^{***} (0.045)	-0.140^{***} (0.033)	0.086 (0.052)
PRD2009	0.007 (0.028)	0.100* (0.046)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.072
PAN2009	0.022	-0.187^{***}	0.252*** (0.042)	0.053
Turnout 2009	-0.010	0.177*** (0.044)	0.045*	0.256***
Population Log	0.447*** (0.051)	-0.309^{***}	0.007	0.040
Population over 18	(0.031) -0.137^{***} (0.034)	0.407***	-0.045	0.130**
Population over 65	-0.011	-0.167^{***}	0.372***	0.106**
Area	0.049	0.128***	-0.042	(0.039) 0.227*** (0.042)
Density	-0.071	(0.036) -0.014 (0.132)	0.009	(0.042) 0.087
Indigenous	(0.106) 2.672	(0.102) 10.317***	(0.065) 6.973***	(0.111) 6.513***
Catholic	(1.797) 7.678***	(1.818) -6.405*	(1.674) 7.954**	(1.777) 8.861**
Nonreligious	(2.228) 0.049**	(3.022) -0.015	(2.429) -0.005	(2.964) 0.029*
Education	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.013)
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)
College degree	6.653 (3.806)	-2.444 (4.255)	4.236 (2.472)	-5.731* (2.917)
Illiteracy	-2.259 (2.263)	0.863 (0.984)	2.415 (1.629)	1.203 (0.829)
Inhabitants per house	-13.283** (4.325)	6.388 ^{**} (2.271)	0.559 (3.140)	-5.953** (1.812)
Population in the labor market	-0.002 (0.144)	-0.456^{**} (0.175)	0.200 (0.208)	-0.402 (0.227)
Female population in the labor market	-5.703*** (1.489)	16.054*** (1.583)	-0.909 (1.561)	11.114*** (2.404)
No insurance	-8.252 (6.764)	9.730* (3.968)	3.559 (3.624)	6.405 (3.473)
Female head of household	1.303 ^{***} (0.355)	0.292 (0.396)	-0.389 (0.260)	1.293*** (0.324)
Inhabitants per room	0.714 (2.111)	-4.673 (2.839)	5.236 ^{**} (1.890)	1.382 (2.659)
Dirt floor	2.584 (1.914)	4.415* (2.190)	-5.059** (1.805)	1.926 (1.878)
All services	1.489 (0.806)	1.034 (0.918)	-2.143** (0.719)	0.312 (0.754)
No services	2.215** (0.763)	-0.876 (0.952)	-1.401^{**} (0.535)	0.174

Table E.8: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Alternative Specification of Party Strongholds.

Car	-2.180***	1.055	0.964*	-0.061
	(0.639)	(0.738)	(0.458)	(0.636)
Mahila ahaan	2 101	1 1 / 1	2 592	0.042
Mobile phone	-2.101	-1.141	2.383	-0.043
	(2.127)	(1.634)	(1.437)	(1.607)
Internet	0.170	0.573	0.196	1.097
	(0.647)	(0.671)	(0.343)	(0.649)
Provimity × PRI Stronghold	0.030	0.083	0.067	0.134
Toxinity × TRESCONDIC	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.092)	(0.143)
	, , ,	, ,	, ,	
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.009	-0.088	-0.047	-0.141^{***}
	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.046)	(0.038)
PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-0.550	1.110***	0.489*	1.089***
0 0	(0.440)	(0.278)	(0.216)	(0.264)
D 1 1 DDD (r 1 11	0.1/1	0.0004	0.024	0.104
Proximity × PKD Stronghold	0.161	-0.0004	-0.024	0.124
	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.065)	(0.131)
High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold	0.625	-0.272	0.373	0.821
	(0.469)	(0.632)	(0.398)	(0.467)
Provimity × PAN Stronghold	-0.054	0.058	-0.005	0.0002
Troxinity × Thit offolgiold	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.029)
	(0.000)	(000 - 00)	(0.00-)	(010_7)
High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold	0.402	1.441***	-1.021^{*}	0.869**
	(0.405)	(0.369)	(0.477)	(0.283)
Proximity × PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization	-0.021	-0.101	-0.064	-0.165
	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.096)	(0.156)
				. ,
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold \times High Mobilization	5.413***	-2.842**	-2.309***	-0.169
	(0.874)	(1.030)	(0.405)	(0.881)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-1.185^{*}	-0.291	0.987*	-0.613^{*}
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.487)	(0.324)	(0.403)	(0.257)
Constant	1 000***	0 505***	0.000***	F (01***
Constant	-1.622	-2.327	-2.982	- 3.601
	(0.217)	(0.007)	(0.200)	(0.094)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
\mathbb{R}^2	0.858	0.865	0.888	0.801
F-Statistic (df = 147)	606.8	803	999.9	364.8
Notes:		***Signif	icant at the 0.1 percent leve	1.

** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.9: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Alternative Specification of Party Strongholds.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.091	0.037	-0.077	-0.162
-	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.086)	(0.101)
PRD Stronghold	6.102	-2.410	-2.625	0.642
	(0.890)	(0.525)	(0.753)	(0.676)
PAN Stronghold	-2.031	-1.692	2.758	-1.072
C C	(0.631)	(0.602)	(1.010)	(0.309)

	Peña Nieto vote share (1)	López Obrador vote share (2)	Vázquez Mota vote share (3)	Turnout (4)
Proximity	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.023)	0.034** (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)
PRI stronghold	-0.568^{*} (0.226)	-0.216 (0.240)	0.139 (0.136)	-0.683*** (0.186)
High Mobilization	-0.435 (0.432)	-0.460 (0.462)	0.271 (0.408)	-0.705^{**} (0.254)
PRD stronghold	-0.881^{***} (0.242)	0.519 (0.293)	0.028 (0.141)	-0.463^{**} (0.172)
PAN stronghold	0.799 (0.465)	-5.381^{***} (0.828)	3.056*** (0.507)	-1.921^{***} (0.486)
PRI 2009	0.607*** (0.042)	-0.378^{***} (0.065)	-0.132^{***} (0.039)	0.070 (0.068)
PRD2009	-0.065 (0.036)	0.386 ^{***} (0.075)	-0.137^{***} (0.036)	0.148* (0.066)
PAN2009	0.103* (0.040)	-0.490^{***} (0.081)	0.476*** (0.052)	0.062 (0.071)
Turnout 2009	-0.028 (0.032)	0.287*** (0.068)	0.063* (0.028)	0.370*** (0.066)
Population Log	-0.178 (0.115)	0.124 (0.148)	0.055 (0.075)	-0.006 (0.119)
Population over 18	2.011 (2.345)	14.206*** (2.960)	-7.723*** (2.314)	8.973*** (1.805)
Population over 65	8.652*** (2.389)	-19.502^{***} (4.390)	19.110*** (3.256)	7.915* (3.660)
Area	0.066*** (0.018)	-0.031 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.027*
Density	-0.00000 (0.00001)	0.00003** (0.00001)	-0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001
Indigenous	-3.713 (3.921)	-5.322 (3.746)	1.777 (1.961)	-8.146* (3.200)
Catholic	-2.192 (2.537)	2.435 (2.264)	0.606 (0.852)	1.063 (0.830)
Nonreligious	-11.624^{**} (4.298)	2.795 (3.047)	-4.386 (2.591)	-13.035*** (2.203)
Education	0.413* (0.197)	-1.701*** (0.314)	0.708*	-0.738^{**} (0.228)
College degree	-9.400*** (1.884)	28.810*** (3.130)	-2.233 (2.284)	18.909*** (2.490)
Illiteracy	2.561	-18.656*** (4.927)	9.502* (4 739)	-5.689
Inhabitants per house	1.424*** (0.403)	1.302* (0.535)	-0.960** (0.318)	1.840*** (0.340)
Population in the labor market	2.422	-12.898** (4.621)	7.513** (2.560)	-2.864
Female population in the labor market	0.111 (2.075)	8.931* (3.641)	-4.335 (2.276)	4.812* (2.241)
No insurance	0.948	-0.224 (1.502)	-1.282 (0.813)	-0.661 (0.896)
Female head of household	3.470** (1 113)	-1.137 (1.488)	-3.407^{***} (0.729)	-0.915 (0.814)
Inhabitants per room	-1.966^{*} (0.836)	1.088	0.617	-0.243
Dirt floor	-2.030	-2.268 (2.450)	3.634* (1.740)	-0.072
All services	-0.827 (0.701)	1.038	0.001	0.374
No services	-4.797	(0.210) 6.043 (4.707)	(0.424) 9.048*** (2.297)	10.698*
	(4.190)	(4./9/)	(2.387)	(4.604)

Table E.10: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Alternative Specification of Party Strongholds.

Car	-0.302	0.044	3.519***	2.979***
	(0.978)	(1.351)	(0.858)	(0.802)
16111 1	0.051	1 550	0 555	2.21/
Mobile phone	-0.051	-1.572	-0.755	-2.246
	(0.968)	(1.705)	(0.902)	(1.483)
Internet	2.105*	-6.555***	7.774***	2.507*
	(1.067)	(1.260)	(1.166)	(1.098)
Provinity × PPI Stronghold	0.121	0 107	0.145	0.127
Troxinity × TRi Suonghold	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.127)	(0.128)
		· · · ·	· · · ·	
Proximity × High Mobilization	-0.080	-0.061	-0.042	-0.176^{*}
	(0.211)	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.072)
PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization	-0.145	1.132*	0.391	1.333***
0 0	(0.491)	(0.455)	(0.246)	(0.303)
		0.010	0.010	0.000
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.305	-0.319	-0.010	-0.023
	(0.175)	(0.229)	(0.065)	(0.159)
High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	1.371*	-3.904***	1.922**	-0.485
0 0	(0.620)	(1.140)	(0.744)	(0.568)
Provinity × PAN Stronghold	0.502*	0.840***	0.051	0.202*
Troxinity × TAN Stronghold	(0.249)	(0,200)	(0.222)	(0.188)
	(0.249)	(0.209)	(0.222)	(0.100)
High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold	-0.182	7.341***	-4.881^{***}	2.480***
	(0.833)	(1.056)	(0.968)	(0.608)
Proximity × PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization	-0.134	-0.092	0.076	-0.142
	(0.300)	(0.187)	(0.177)	(0.171)

Proximity \times PRD Stronghold \times High Mobilization	5.886***	-2.024	-2.607***	0.823
	(0.916)	(0.577)	(0.752)	(0.715)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-1.351*	-2.474***	2.715**	-1.307***
, , ,	(0.655)	(0.604)	(0.927)	(0.344)
Constant	16 552***	10 147	2 027	21 772***
Constant	(4 262)	(7.720)	(2,624)	(4.618)
	(4.362)	(7.739)	(2.624)	(4.010)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
\mathbb{R}^2	0.873	0.868	0.912	0.812
F-Statistic (df = 147)	493.4	472.2	745	310
Notes:		***Signif	icant at the 0.1 percent level	1.

* Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.11: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Model that contains an interaction of Proximity with all covariates.

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	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	6.450	-8.453	-0.560	-2.292
	(3.938)	(6.461)	(2.812)	(3.144)
PRD Stronghold	35.319	-26.961	0.256	6.345
-	(13.333)	(10.214)	(8.873)	(10.368)
PAN Stronghold	4.064	-11.857	2.932	-5.104
C	(4.417)	(6.798)	(3.303)	(3.515)

	Peña Nieto vote share (1)	López Obrador vote share (2)	Vázquez Mota vote share (3)	Turnout (4)
Proximity	6.397 (4.008)	-7.464 (6.563)	-1.307 (2.744)	-2.164 (3.176)
PRI stronghold	-0.848^{**} (0.288)	0.122 (0.314)	0.055 (0.191)	-0.691^{**} (0.221)
High Mobilization	-0.505 (0.407)	0.185 (0.463)	-0.126 (0.356)	-0.569* (0.253)
PRD stronghold	-1.007^{***} (0.276)	0.201 (0.362)	-0.065 (0.202)	-0.946^{***} (0.231)
PAN stronghold	1.608 ^{**} (0.574)	-6.407^{***} (0.894)	3.651*** (0.607)	-1.689^{**} (0.515)
PRI 2009	0.622*** (0.046)	-0.389^{***} (0.068)	-0.126^{**} (0.049)	0.078 (0.072)
PRD2009	-0.054 (0.040)	0.386 ^{***} (0.070)	-0.126^{**} (0.045)	0.169* (0.070)
PAN2009	0.114* (0.045)	-0.486^{***} (0.086)	0.464*** (0.056)	0.067
Turnout 2009	-0.008 (0.038)	0.278*** (0.068)	0.063	0.382*** (0.068)
Population Log	-0.171 (0.129)	0.151	-0.003	-0.018 (0.125)
Population over 18	-0.00001	0.00004*** (0.00001)	-0.00002*** (0.00001)	0.00001
Population over 65	3.397	12.416***	-8.660***	7.561*** (2 266)
Area	8.939** (2.200)	-20.024*** (4.596)	18.330*** (2.650)	6.709 (4.566)
Density	0.232	(4.550) -1.760^{***} (0.225)	0.978***	(4.500) -0.708^{**} (0.251)
Indigenous	(0.252) -9.868*** (2.258)	(0.323)	(0.247) 5.065* (2.062)	(0.231) 17.969*** (2.822)
Catholic	(2.358) -3.380 (5.671)	(3.438) -14.031* ((.244)	5.725	(2.822) -11.020^{*}
Nonreligious	(3.671) 1.237* (2.517)	(6.244)	-0.772	(4.901) 2.187***
Education	4.163	(0.622)	(0.475)	(0.407)
College degree	(2.784) 	(5.179) 8.899*	(3.222) -5.025	(3.374) 3.083
Illiteracy	(2.626) 0.724	(4.433) 1.041	(2.979) 	(2.788) -0.047
	(1.169)	(1.792)	(1.036)	(1.133)
Inhabitants per house	3.157* (1.457)	0.407 (1.742)	-3.586*** (1.065)	0.001 (0.919)
Population in the labor market	-1.633 (1.105)	-0.434 (1.422)	1.103 (0.697)	-1.218 (0.859)
Female population in the labor market	-0.003 (2.848)	-1.764 (2.789)	1.462 (2.066)	0.729 (1.876)
No insurance	0.345 (0.853)	0.786 (1.025)	-0.370 (0.536)	1.049 (0.585)
Female head of household	-7.719 (5.059)	4.508 (5.795)	10.875*** (3.217)	7.708 (5.104)
Inhabitants per room	-0.382 (1.175)	-0.683 (1.423)	3.955*** (0.993)	2.508* (1.065)
Dirt floor	-0.096 (1.272)	-1.776 (1.575)	-1.282 (1.178)	-3.104* (1.480)
All services	2.749 (1.532)	-8.032*** (1.594)	8.684*** (1.232)	2.538 (1.398)
No services	0.069** (0.025)	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.016)	0.051** (0.019)

Table E.12: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Model	
that contains an interaction of Proximity with all covariates.	

Car	5.850***	-9.564***	1.431	-2.049*
	(0.947)	(1.395)	(1.029)	(0.927)
Mobile phone	8.692***	-12.120***	1.464***	-1.243*
	(0.561)	(0.581)	(0.438)	(0.605)
Internet	10.569***	-7.223***	-2.959***	0.150
	(0.547)	(0.650)	(0.497)	(0.514)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.459	-0.331	0.149	0.262
	(0.257)	(0.326)	(0.146)	(0.215)
High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	0.310	-3.471*	1.557	-1.138
	(1.422)	(1.427)	(0.889)	(1.675)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-0.605	1.728***	-0.567	0.640**
	(0.377)	(0.345)	(0.328)	(0.235)
High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-0.726	8.829***	-4.845^{**}	3.510***
	(1.230)	(0.976)	(1.714)	(0.941)
Proximity × PRI 2009	-0.005	0.055	-0.036	0.011
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.043)
Proximity × PRD 2009	-0.030	0.038	0.001	0.006
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Proximity \times PAN 2009	-0.059	0.002	0.061	0.002
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.040)
Proximity \times Turnout 2009	-0.031	0.008	-0.008	-0.033
	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.044)
Proximity \times Population Log	0.004	-0.032	0.131	0.082
	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.082)	(0.103)
Proximity \times Density	0.00001**	-0.00002^{***}	0.00000	-0.00000
	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Proximity \times Population over 18	-4.079*	4.980	1.591	2.832**
	(2.027)	(2.851)	(1.292)	(1.035)
Proximity \times Population over 65	1.905	-0.317	0.356	2.174
	(2.383)	(3.248)	(1.997)	(2.397)
Proximity \times Education	0.117	-0.032	-0.400*	-0.339*
	(0.170)	(0.217)	(0.174)	(0.150)
$Proximity \times College \ degree$	1.933	-2.297	4.258*	4.155 ^{**}
	(1.935)	(2.566)	(1.778)	(1.482)
Proximity × Illiteracy	0.343	19.916*	13.679*	-7.736
	(7.902)	(10.083)	(5.504)	(6.622)
Proximity \times Inhabitants per house	0.594	-0.101	-0.102	0.291
	(0.528)	(0.535)	(0.350)	(0.379)
Proximity \times Population in the labor market	-2.920 (2.864)	2.649 (4.524)	-0.494 (2.665)	-0.693 (2.078)
Proximity \times Female population in the labor market	1.973	-0.933	0.597	1.137
	(2.341)	(3.645)	(2.317)	(2.094)
Proximity \times No insurance	0.236 (1.268)	-2.488 (1.394)	1.184 (0.913)	-1.238 (0.996)
Proximity \times Female head of household	0.541 (1.288)	-2.818 (1.663)	0.071 (1.037)	-1.946 (1.118)
Proximity \times Inhabitants per room	-0.342	2.953**	-1.003	2.094 ^{**}
	(0.824)	(1.065)	(0.828)	(0.793)
Proximity \times Dirt floor	-5.507*	-1.377	5.937	-2.044
	(2.696)	(3.283)	(3.134)	(2.573)
Proximity \times All services	-4.188**	1.718	1.621	-1.251
	(1.325)	(1.943)	(1.059)	(1.362)
Proximity \times No services	30.376*	-21.207	-0.973	9.293
	(14.130)	(14.657)	(11.478)	(14.546)
Proximity × Car	1.305	0.123	-0.056	1.503
	(1.267)	(1.801)	(0.853)	(0.815)
Proximity \times Mobile	0.312	0.579	1.224	2.409
	(1.422)	(1.977)	(1.276)	(1.337)
Proximity × Internet	-1.635	1.680	-1.906**	-1.820
	(1.261)	(1.347)	(0.693)	(1.055)
Proximity \times Area	-0.041	-0.137	0.001	-0.209

Notes:		***Signi	ficant at the 0.1 percent level	
$\chi^2 (df = 168)$	22,158.560***	21,627.780***	25,948.360***	17,726.120***
Adjusted R ²	0.872	0.865	0.910	0.806
\mathbb{R}^2	0.874	0.867	0.911	0.809
Ν	10,715	10,715	10,715	10,715
	(5.220)	(7.077)	(3.285)	(4.666)
Constant	12.249*	14.789*	3.196	32.393***
× High Mobilization	(1.882)	(0.705)	(2.109)	(1.182)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-1.569	-5.558***	4.093	-3.585**
imes High Mobilization	(12.575)	(6.946)	(7.686)	(9.513)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	28.621*	-18.603**	0.700	8.241
imes High Mobilization	(0.337)	(0.398)	(0.278)	(0.266)
Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	0.095	-0.043	-0.476	-0.346
	(0.155)	(0.178)	(0.138)	(0.150)

**Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.13: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Logit Transformation of the Dependent Variable.

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	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.003	0.002	0.000	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)
PRD Stronghold	1.512	-1.437	-0.094	0.133
U U	(0.570)	(0.381)	(1.033)	(14.236)
PAN Stronghold	-0.191	-0.344	-0.003	-0.055
C	(0.112)	(0.067)	(0.096)	(3.713)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity	0.0001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.0004 (0.0003)
PRI stronghold	-0.051^{**} (0.016)	0.0004 (0.018)	-0.0001 (0.017)	-0.011*** (0.003)
High Mobilization	-0.044^{*} (0.019)	-0.001 (0.028)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.010^{**} (0.004)
PRD stronghold	-0.115^{***}	0.005	-0.126^{***}	-0.016***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.004)
PAN stronghold	0.084*	-0.518^{***}	-0.051	-0.028***
	(0.032)	(0.082)	(0.032)	(0.008)
PRI 2009	0.036 ^{***}	-0.022^{***}	0.0004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)
PRD2009	-0.004	0.020 ^{***}	-0.002	0.003 ^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)
PAN2009	0.006**	-0.027^{***}	0.051***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Turnout 2009	-0.002	0.018***	-0.001	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Population Log	-0.002	0.022	0.014*	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Population over 18	0.118	0.750 ^{***}	-0.156	0.138 ^{***}
	(0.149)	(0.185)	(0.149)	(0.034)
Population over 65	0.664***	-0.908***	1.330 ^{***}	0.116
	(0.161)	(0.253)	(0.246)	(0.067)
Area	0.003***	-0.002	-0.001	0.0004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Density	0.00000	0.00000*	-0.00000^{***}	0.00000
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Indigenous	-0.250	-0.251	-0.041	-0.154^{**}
	(0.201)	(0.227)	(0.176)	(0.058)
Catholic	-0.139	0.204	-0.040	0.013
	(0.131)	(0.197)	(0.088)	(0.015)
Nonreligious	-0.775 ^{**}	0.124	-0.256	-0.212^{***}
	(0.256)	(0.207)	(0.196)	(0.041)
Education	0.027*	-0.071^{***}	0.008	-0.013***
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.003)
College degree	-0.503^{***}	1.585 ^{***}	0.485***	0.299***
	(0.116)	(0.176)	(0.134)	(0.041)
Illiteracy	-0.181 (0.269)	-1.280^{***} (0.356)	0.289 (0.504)	-0.087 (0.065)
Inhabitants per house	0.085 ^{**}	0.070*	-0.078^{**}	0.034***
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.007)
Population in the labor market	0.199 (0.131)	-0.662* (0.303)	0.691** (0.227)	-0.025 (0.055)
Female population in the labor market	-0.057	0.639**	-0.457^{*}	0.088*
	(0.128)	(0.243)	(0.203)	(0.040)
No insurance	0.105	0.144	-0.061	-0.004
	(0.056)	(0.095)	(0.080)	(0.017)
Female head of household	0.244 ^{***}	0.005	-0.257***	-0.013
	(0.063)	(0.102)	(0.073)	(0.015)
Inhabitants per room	-0.093	0.093	-0.095	-0.011
	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.015)
Dirt floor	-0.098 (0.135)	-0.170 (0.158)	0.152 (0.168)	-0.001 (0.026)
All services	-0.047 (0.038)	0.095 (0.050)	0.036 (0.049)	0.011 (0.013)
No services	-0.095	0.251	1.208***	0.172*
	(0.207)	(0.301)	(0.263)	(0.086)

Table E.14: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. L	ogi
Transformation of the Dependent Variable	Č

Notes:		***Signif	icant at the 0.1 percent leve	1.
F-Statistic (df = 147)	434.7	459.3	567.6	288.9
\mathbb{R}^2	0.858	0.865	0.888	0.801
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
	(0.217)	(0.607)	(0.266)	(0.094)
Constant	-1.822^{+++}	-2.527***	-2.982^{+++}	-5.601***
	1 000***	0 505***	2 002***	F (01***
	(0.116)	(0.079)	(0.101)	(0.019)
Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-0.135	-0.444***	0.013	-0.059**
	(0.568)	(0.381)	(1.033)	(0.172)
Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	1.479**	-1.406^{***}	-0.103	0.132
				. ,
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.003)
Proximity × PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization	-0.002	0.006	0.008	-0.002
	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.014)
High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-0.020	0.664***	-0.184^{*}	0.057***
	()	()	(/	()
Toxinity A TAN Sublightid	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.003)
Provimity × PAN Stronghold	-0.050**	0 105***	_0.011	0.007*
	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.105)	(0.033)
High Mobilization $ imes$ PRD Stronghold	0.127	-0.110	0.270**	-0.018
	(0.01.1)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.000)
roxinity × rKD stronghold	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.003)
Provinity × PPD Stronghold	0.020**	0.025*	0.012	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.004)
PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-0.063*	0.014	0.047	0.019***
	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.006	-0.005	-0.008	-0.003*
	0.007	0.005	0.000	0.000*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	0.005	0.001	-0.004	0.002
	(0.061)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.022)
Internet	0.135*	-0.481 ****	0.362	0.043
•	0.405*	0.404***		
*	(0.057)	(0.113)	(0.104)	(0.030)
Mobile phone	0.027	-0.079	0.037	-0.027
	(0.056)	(0.089)	(0.078)	(0.014)
Car	-0.062	-0.090	0.124	0.037**

**Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table E.15: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Proximity as the log transformation of distance.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.022	0.370	0.265	0.643
U U	(0.354)	(0.306)	(0.289)	(0.324)
PRD Stronghold	-3.064	2.791	-0.470	-0.469
0	(1.521)	(0.983)	(1.191)	(1.137)
PAN Stronghold	1.433	1.793	-1.878	1.595
	(0.560)	(0.405)	(0.855)	(0.624)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Distance)	-0.129	0.120	-0.081	-0.104
	(0.089)	(0.136)	(0.064)	(0.091)
PRI stronghold	-0.636^{**}	-0.103	0.311	-0.520*
	(0.234)	(0.252)	(0.180)	(0.264)
High Mobilization	-1.280^{**}	0.131	0.354	-1.017**
	(0.444)	(0.464)	(0.501)	(0.312)
PRD stronghold	-0.409	-0.088	0.005	-0.605**
	(0.292)	(0.503)	(0.177)	(0.205)
PAN stronghold	-0.304	-3.761***	3.462***	-1.031
	(0.415)	(0.936)	(0.727)	(0.580)
PRI 2009	0.613***	-0.363***	-0.153^{***}	0.067
	(0.040)	(0.067)	(0.044)	(0.068)
PRD2009	-0.081*	0.405***	-0.131^{***}	0.153*
	(0.035)	(0.074)	(0.035)	(0.066)
PAN2009	0.079*	-0.489^{***}	0.488***	0.049
	(0.036)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.072)
Turnout 2009	-0.017	0.277***	0.061*	0.371***
	(0.030)	(0.070)	(0.029)	(0.067)
Population Log	-0.164	0.122	0.049	0.0003
	(0.112)	(0.147)	(0.071)	(0.119)
Population over 18	1.843	15.121***	-7.863^{***}	9.622***
	(2.333)	(2.857)	(2.178)	(1.814)
Population over 65	9.388 ^{***}	-21.119^{***}	19.521***	7.412*
	(2.417)	(4.172)	(3.171)	(3.707)
Area	0.066***	-0.030	-0.007	0.028*
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Density	-0.00000 (0.00001)	0.00002** (0.00001)	-0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001 (0.00001)
Indigenous	-4.881	-5.825	2.771	-8.879**
	(3.918)	(3.798)	(2.161)	(3.098)
Catholic	-2.076	1.838	0.864	0.809
	(2.434)	(2.464)	(0.841)	(0.874)
Nonreligious	-10.515^{*} (4.127)	1.614 (3.222)	-4.305 (2.538)	-13.158*** (2.285)
Education	0.403*	-1.810***	0.817**	-0.759***
	(0.192)	(0.302)	(0.281)	(0.225)
College degree	-9.125^{***}	29.915***	-3.229	19.394***
	(1.826)	(3.203)	(2.269)	(2.496)
Illiteracy	2.468	-18.676^{***}	9.865	-5.672
	(5.736)	(5.366)	(5.112)	(3.834)
Inhabitants per house	1.312***	1.485**	-1.010^{**}	1.880***
	(0.380)	(0.541)	(0.338)	(0.342)
Population in the labor market	3.047	-14.006^{**}	7.857**	-3.215
	(2.075)	(4.601)	(2.603)	(2.849)
Female population in the labor market	-0.582	9.937**	-4.730^{*}	4.928*
	(2.176)	(3.619)	(2.292)	(2.202)
No insurance	1.059	-0.314 (1.555)	-1.217 (0.832)	-0.547 (0.880)
Female head of household	3.550** (1.081)	-1.076 (1.495)	-3.427*** (0.759)	-0.806 (0.840)
Inhabitants per room	-1.792* (0.839)	1.113 (1.223)	0.569	-0.082 (0.738)
Dirt floor	-1.788	-2.399	3.784* (1.899)	0.233
All services	(1.088)	1.218	0.037	0.337
No services	-4.156	3.711 (5.429)	9.471** (2.925)	9.343 (4.870)

Table E.16: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Prov	-
imity as the log transformation of distance.	

Car	-0.128	-0.628	3.839***	2.749***
	(0.955)	(1.379)	(0.882)	(0.828)
Mahila phone	0.008	1 282	0.772	1 099
wobie prone	(0.946)	(1 781)	(0.888)	(1.516)
	(0.0 10)	(111 01)	(0.000)	(1010)
Internet	1.924	-6.599^{***}	7.890***	2.450*
	(1.056)	(1.281)	(1.148)	(1.199)
High Mobilization × PRI stronghold	0.275	0 107	0.015	0.585
	(0.733)	(0.419)	(0.630)	(0.569)
High Mobilization × PRD stronghold	10.968**		2 306	1 434
	(3.515)	(2.578)	(3.005)	(2.103)
	(0.0.20)	()	(0.000)	()
High Mobilization \times PAN stronghold	-0.946	2.068*	-0.998	-0.145
	(1.172)	(0.951)	(1.643)	(1.162)
log(Distance) × PRI stronghold	-0.157	-0.033	0.069	-0.062
	(0.199)	(0.206)	(0.135)	(0.178)
$\log(\text{Distance}) \times \text{PRD stronghold}$	-0.362	0.125	0.034	-0.173
	(0.205)	(0.295)	(0.113)	(0.184)
$\log(\text{Distance}) \times \text{PAN stronghold}$	1 821***	-1 928***	-0.270	-0.449
log(Distance) × mit stronghold	(0.341)	(0.442)	(0.513)	(0.416)
	*			*
$log(Distance) \times High Mobilization$	0.602*	-0.158	-0.088	0.446*
	(0.279)	(0.262)	(0.202)	(0.215)
$log(Distance) \times PRI$ stronghold	-0.337	0.441	0.365	0.364
× High Mobilization	(0.465)	(0.350)	(0.320)	(0.339)
log(Distance) × PRD stronghold	-3175*	2 704*	-0 335	-0.638
\times High Mobilization	(1.458)	(1.083)	(1.208)	(1.071)
	()	((=++)	(
$log(Distance) \times PAN stronghold$	-0.860	3.759***	-1.438	1.703*
× High Mobilization	(0.713)	(0.593)	(0.899)	(0.669)
Constant	16 110***	9 868	3 041	31.065***
Constant	(4.267)	(8.095)	(2.817)	(4.760)
λτ.	10 5/7	10 5/7	10 5/7	10 577
N P2	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
K^-	0.874	U.866	0.910	0.811
F - statistic (df = 14/)	494.9	404.0	/30.8	308.8
Notes:			*** Significant at th	ne 0.1 percent level.

**Significant at the 0.1 percent level. *Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	$\Pr(> t)$
PRI	(Intercept)	54.77	2.28	23.99	0.00
	Proximity	-0.04	0.03	-1.15	0.25
	PRI Stronghold	0.23	0.20	1.15	0.25
	High Mobilization	-0.50	0.22	-2.21	0.03
	PRD Stronghold	-3.14	0.20	-15.51	0.00
	PAN Stronghold	1.47	0.36	4.07	0.00
	Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	-0.07	0.19	-0.36	0.72
	Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.26	0.16	-1.61	0.11
	PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-3.02	0.33	-9.27	0.00
	Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.49	0.24	2.06	0.04
	High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	-2.02	1.28	-1.58	0.11
	Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-1.05	0.28	-3.75	0.00
	High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-1.61	1.17	-1.37	0.17
	Proximity \times PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	0.67	0.29	2.33	0.02
	Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	48.71	10.97	4.44	0.00
	Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-0.94	1.89	-0.50	0.62
PRD	(Intercept)	19.59	2.26	8.69	0.00
	Proximity	0.00	0.03	0.11	0.91
	PRI Stronghold	-0.43	0.20	-2.18	0.03
	High Mobilization	0.54	0.22	2.42	0.02
	PRD Stronghold	3.86	0.20	19.30	0.00
	PAN Stronghold	-4.95	0.36	-13.85	0.00
	Proximity × PRI Stronghold	0.12	0.19	0.65	0.51
	Proximity × High Mobilization	0.34	0.16	2.12	0.03
	PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	2.80	0.32	8.71	0.00
	Proximity × PRD Stronghold	-0.51	0.24	-2.16	0.03
	High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold	2.51	1.26	1.99	0.05
	Proximity × PAN Stronghold	1.05	0.28	3.79	0.00
	High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold	6.34	1.16	5.48	0.00
	Proximity × PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization	-0.68	0.28	-2.38	0.02
	Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	-56.74	10.83	-5.24	0.00
	Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-2.92	1.86	-1.57	0.12
PAN	(Intercept)	19.64	1.72	11.44	0.00
	Proximity	0.04	0.02	1.49	0.14
	PRI Stronghold	0.15	0.15	0.98	0.32
	High Mobilization	0.13	0.17	0.77	0.44
	PRD Stronghold	-0.62	0.15	-4.07	0.00
	PAN Stronghold	4.20	0.27	15.43	0.00
	Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	0.02	0.14	0.13	0.90
	Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.11	0.12	-0.94	0.35
	PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	0.39	0.24	1.60	0.11
	Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.04	0.18	0.25	0.81
	High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold	-1.44	0.96	-1.49	0.14
	Proximity × PAN Stronghold	-0.10	0.21	-0.48	0.63
	High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-5.02	0.88	-5.69	0.00
	Proximity \times PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	-0.05	0.22	-0.25	0.80
	Proximity \times High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	13.95	8.25	1.69	0.09
	Proximity × High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold	4.33	1.42	3.05	0.00

Table E.17: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.

F Placebo Tests

This section provides the full tables of results when testing the benchmark results using different placebo treatments. First, Tables F.2 and F.4 show the results using the vote shares of the 2006 and 2009 elections, respectively. The coefficients for the main regressors in this placebo test are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

It might also be the case that the findings are not exclusive to the State of Mexico and Mexico City, where most of the qualitative evidence involving this instance come from. The model throughout the country would suggest that the effects can be generalizable to the urban areas in the country and not only to the region accounted by the news reports. Therefore, I replicate the analysis considering all precincts in the country with a *Soriana* store at 20 kilometers, or less, of distance. Table F.6 shows that the effects for store proximity within the mobilized strongholds on the vote shares for Peña Nieto and López Obrador are non-significant.

Another potential explanation to the results is that voters' proximity to the stores reflects other characteristics that explain the effects observed in 2012. I test this conjecture by estimating the distances of the precincts to the stores of Walmart-Mexico, the largest supermarket chain in the country and *Soriana*'s main competitor.²⁴ Customers of both supermarket chains have similar socioeconomic characteristics, and the stores are closely located to each other. Therefore, if this test shows effects similar to those in the benchmark estimations, the main results would be explained by the characteristics of the citizens living close to both stores. However, as Table F.8 shows, the effects of proximity to these stores are statistically undistinguishable from zero.

²⁴ The addresses of the stores are available at http://www.walmart.com.mx/buscadorde-tiendas.aspx.

Table F.1: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2006 Presidential Election.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.078	0.141	-0.111	-0.075
	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.109)	(0.074)
PRD Stronghold	4.458	21.475	-7.061	19.120
Ū.	(6.992)	(18.431)	(8.741)	(12.521)
PAN Stronghold	-1.063	-3.356	5.535	0.271
	(1.177)	(1.362)	(1.978)	(1.007)

	PRI 2006 vote share	PRD 2006 vote share	PAN 2006 vote share	Turnout
Provimity	0.012		0.057**	0.039
Tioxinity	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.022)
PRI stronghold	-0.654***	-0.077	0.163	-0.591**
0	(0.191)	(0.322)	(0.199)	(0.188)
High Mobilization	0.323	0.009	-0.208	-0.023
0	(0.243)	(0.534)	(0.502)	(0.304)
PRD stronghold	-0.571**	0.659	0.283	0.074
	(0.176)	(0.346)	(0.193)	(0.222)
PAN stronghold	0.041	-4.446***	3.793***	-1.496**
	(0.231)	(0.916)	(0.819)	(0.558)
PRI 2009	0.440***	-0.559^{***}	-0.004	-0.130^{**}
	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.040)
PRD2009	0.006	0.185***	-0.156^{***}	-0.011
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.050)	(0.034)
PAN2009	0.054** (0.019)	-0.853^{***} (0.083)	0.711*** (0.061)	-0.133^{**} (0.047)
	(0.01))	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.017)
Turnout 2009	-0.043^{**} (0.016)	0.479*** (0.053)	0.012	0.501*** (0.035)
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.020)	(0.000)
Population Log	-0.193 (0.134)	0.249 (0.148)	0.116 (0.139)	0.208 (0.141)
	(0.101)	(01110)	(01105)	(01111)
Population over 18	0.663 (1.945)	9.408** (3.146)	-2.366 (2.579)	9.433*** (2.610)
	(11) 10)	(01110)	(======================================	(21010)
Population over 65	-3.886 (2.338)	-24.724*** (3.710)	27.699*** (3.904)	-4.404 (3.475)
	(2.000)	(0.710)	(0.001)	(01110)
Area	0.034*** (0.010)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.002 (0.015)
	(,	***		
Density	-0.00001 (0.00000)	0.00003*** (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)	0.00002** (0.00001)
	(,	1 626	= == (=
Indigenous	4.403 (3.047)	-4.686 (5.364)	-5.856 (3.083)	-7.696* (3.836)
	0.600	2.222	4.011	0.605
Catholic	(1.135)	(3.063)	-4.011 (3.406)	-0.685 (1.253)
Nameliaiana	2.750	2 021	17.040***	10 (/=***
Nonreligious	(2.463)	(3.185)	(5.027)	(2.377)
Education	0.322	0.070***	1 101***	0.005***
Education	(0.152)	(0.369)	(0.252)	(0.170)
College degree	_1 154	22 223***	-0.700	73 333***
College degree	(1.231)	(3.707)	(2.500)	(2.126)
Illiteracy	11 256*	-46 297***	7 825	-31 174***
interacy	(4.450)	(8.131)	(6.088)	(6.124)
Inhabitants per house	0.516	2 187***	-0.985*	1 749***
FF	(0.282)	(0.534)	(0.446)	(0.449)
Population in the labor market	0.940	-15.196***	3.669	-11.148***
, r	(2.432)	(4.351)	(3.019)	(2.855)
Female population in the labor market	-4.252^{*}	7.115*	3.182	6.475*
I I	(2.099)	(3.509)	(2.337)	(2.668)
No insurance	-1.759^{*}	-1.954	1.394	-2.690^{*}
	(0.848)	(1.584)	(0.979)	(1.201)
Female head of household	2.781***	0.336	-5.758***	-2.085*
	(0.837)	(1.696)	(1.270)	(1.042)
Inhabitants per room	1.019	0.738	-1.609	-0.151
-	(0.587)	(1.134)	(0.927)	(0.745)
Dirt floor	0.278	-2.461	2.932	0.734
	(2.354)	(3.023)	(1.711)	(2.106)
All services	-1.761**	0.212	-0.924	-2.499***
	(0.591)	(0.744)	(0.761)	(0.728)
No services	-5.130	9.394	-1.507	2.661
	(4.407)	(6.263)	(4.846)	(4.998)

Table F.2: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2006 Presidential Election.

Car	-0.756	-0.996	6.450***	3.606**
	(0.660)	(1.435)	(0.994)	(1.141)
Mobile phone	0.472	3.250	-2.262*	2.274
x	(0.876)	(1.750)	(1.149)	(1.446)
Internet	0.121	-12.268***	11.822***	-1.669
	(0.925)	(1.701)	(1.616)	(1.085)
Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	0.151	0.119	-0.117	0.049
	(0.169)	(0.248)	(0.155)	(0.161)
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.196	0.085	0.037	-0.111
	(0.150)	(0.209)	(0.231)	(0.160)
PRI Stronghold $ imes$ High Mobilization	-0.219	0.053	0.978^{*}	0.699
	(0.422)	(0.624)	(0.476)	(0.553)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.228*	-0.202	-0.241	-0.202
	(0.099)	(0.321)	(0.179)	(0.217)
High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	0.513	-7.680**	2.680*	-4.233*
	(1.015)	(2.677)	(1.318)	(1.778)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-0.104	1.029***	-0.309	0.715**
	(0.076)	(0.225)	(0.343)	(0.262)
High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	0.542	7.659***	-7.319***	1.863*
	(0.894)	(1.182)	(1.692)	(0.908)
Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	-0.045	-0.043	-0.088	-0.052
\times High Mobilization	(0.239)	(0.321)	(0.293)	(0.232)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	4.414	21.611	-6.914	19.394
\times High Mobilization	(7.000)	(18.474)	(8.747)	(12.552)
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-0.775	-4.450**	5.751**	-0.371
\times High Mobilization	(1.169)	(1.365)	(1.900)	(0.965)
Constant	3.358	24.573**	3.492	35.605***
	(3.497)	(8.350)	(4.328)	(4.331)
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567
\mathbb{R}^2	0.914	0.867	0.911	0.866
F-Statistic (df = 147)	494.1***	463.7***	730.2***	308.5***
Notes:		***Significant	at the 0.1 percent level.	

**Significant at the 0.1 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table F.3: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Soriana* on Voting Behavior in the 2009 Legislative Election.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	-0.070	0.006	-0.029	-0.138
-	(0.098)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.099)
PRD Stronghold	-11.068	8.086	7.835	-6.966
U	(9.221)	(20.695)	(5.995)	(13.063)
PAN Stronghold	-2.269	3.347	-6.112	-4.762
	(0.959)	(0.674)	(1.070)	(1.540)

	PRI 2006 vote share	PRD 2006 vote share	PAN 2006 vote share	Turnout
Decoviesity	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.022)
PRI stronghold	5.022***	-2.150^{***}	-1.178***	1.182***
-	(0.334)	(0.285)	(0.221)	(0.286)
High Mobilization	2.020***	1.473***	1.890***	6.031***
	(0.234)	(0.326)	(0.517)	(0.550)
PRD stronghold	-2.004*** (0.209)	2.418*** (0.251)	-0.586*** (0.161)	-0.907^{***} (0.271)
PAN stronghold	-2.669^{***} (0.563)	-0.236 (0.331)	1.872*** (0.346)	-2.323*** (0.558)
PRI 2009	0 384***	-0.033	0.046	0.305***
112007	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.064)
PRD2009	-0.126^{**}	0.281***	-0.056*	0.050
	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.062)
PAN2009	-0.112^{**}	-0.063^{*}	0.377***	0.148*
	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.067)
Turnout 2009	0.243***	0.048	0.022	0.423***
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.063)
Population Log	-0.627***	-0.149	-0.063	-0.898***
	(0.121)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.164)
Population over 18	1.329	0.305	-2.071	-0.452
	(1.733)	(1.561)	(1.226)	(1.864)
Population over 65	-4.069	5.653**	9.949***	15.685***
	(2.629)	(2.077)	(2.222)	(3.847)
Area	0.013	0.003	0.014	0.026
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Density	0.00000	-0.00000	-0.00001*	-0.00001
	(0.00000)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)
Indigenous	4.132	-5.449	-2.024	-3.600
	(7.809)	(3.427)	(3.650)	(5.022)
Catholic	2.000	0.311	6.232**	7.951***
	(1.492)	(1.012)	(2.039)	(1.827)
Nonreligious	-4.207	-1.778	11.391***	9.164**
	(2.598)	(1.836)	(2.863)	(2.953)
Education	-0.426^{***}	0.157	0.246*	0.261
	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.119)	(0.168)
College degree	1.473	-0.793	-5.029***	-1.673
	(1.416)	(1.514)	(1.293)	(2.197)
Illiteracy	-6.891	3.900	6.279	15.391*
	(5.201)	(6.839)	(3.700)	(6.412)
Inhabitants per house	0.068	1.013***	-0.376	0.878
	(0.366)	(0.282)	(0.349)	(0.501)
Population in the labor market	0.810	-1.639	2.979	1.507
	(2.552)	(2.083)	(2.120)	(3.146)
Female population in the labor market	0.256	0.709	-5.790**	-3.696
	(2.200)	(1.842)	(1.831)	(2.955)
No insurance	-0.010	-1.043	-0.415	-2.296
	(0.903)	(0.719)	(0.873)	(1.180)
Female head of household	1.103	-0.717	0.134	1.480
	(0.755)	(0.770)	(0.630)	(1.212)
Inhabitants per room	-1.939^{*}	0.843	0.269	-0.660
	(0.788)	(0.513)	(0.665)	(1.121)
Dirt floor	1.297	2.231	0.768	3.876
	(2.253)	(1.715)	(1.740)	(2.724)
All services	0.238	-0.153	-0.570	-0.833
	(0.463)	(0.442)	(0.698)	(0.954)
No services	0.022	-1.346	-1.616	-4.370
	(5.267)	(4.869)	(5.288)	(6.148)

Table F.4: Effects of the Location of Soriana stores on Voting Behavior in the 2009 Presidential Election.

Car	1.026	0.525	0.659	2.417*
	(0.820)	(0.616)	(0.679)	(1.217)
Mobile phone	0.007	-2 408*	0.497	5 039**
Nobile phone	(1.153)	(1.106)	(0.949)	(1.558)
	(()		(
Internet	-2.028*	-0.847	1.362	-0.461
	(0.907)	(0.922)	(1.159)	(1.696)
Proximity × PRI Stronghold	-0.289	0.248*	0.055	0.018
	(0.209)	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.192)
				* *
Proximity \times High Mobilization	-0.073	-0.113	-0.390	-0.461**
	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.250)	(0.172)
PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	2.767***	-0.510	-1.875^{***}	0.084
8 8	(0.645)	(0.472)	(0.431)	(0.559)
		* * *		
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.144	0.868***	0.198	1.014***
	(0.087)	(0.193)	(0.112)	(0.206)
High Mobilization \times PRD Stronghold	-1.197	8.009**	-3.618**	3.903**
0	(1.288)	(2.718)	(1.109)	(1.469)
D 1 1 DAMO: 1 11	0.1/0	0.000	0.040	0.010
Proximity × PAN Stronghold	-0.163	0.222	0.040	0.312
	(0.303)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.221)
High Mobilization \times PAN Stronghold	-1.438	-2.405***	6.960***	3.940***
Ŭ Ŭ	(0.766)	(0.646)	(0.905)	(1.112)
Decimiter V DDI Cteon chold	0.200	0.006	0.215	0.220
Y High Mobilization	(0.299	-0.096	(0.266)	(0.217)
	(0.200)	(0.157)	(0.200)	(0.217)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	-11.132	7.363	8.036	-7.494
× High Mobilization	(9.223)	(20.724)	(6.018)	(13.072)
Provimity × PAN Stronghold	_2 025*	3 271***	_5753***	-4 588**
\times High Mobilization	(0.996)	(0.672)	(1.108)	(1.530)
,	(0)	(**** _)	()	(1000)
Constant	16.425***	9.778**	-4.501	20.918***
	(2.852)	(3.255)	(3.393)	(6.153)
Municipal dummies	1	1	\checkmark	1
N	10.567	10.567	10.567	10.567
\mathbb{R}^2	0.782	0.881	0.935	0.802
$\chi^2 (df = 147)$	767.3***	467.5***	738.6***	464.2***
Notes:		***Significant	at the 0.1 percent level.	
			r r	

* Significant at the 0.1 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. * Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table F.5: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Precincts outside Mexico City and the State of Mexico.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	0.0768	0.1066	-0.3897	-0.1942
0	(0.1938)	(0.2336)	(0.3553)	(0.2599)
PRD Stronghold	0.3377	0.2572	-0.8173	0.0180
U	(0.8218)	(0.8695)	(0.6698)	(0.5260)
PAN Stronghold	-0.2329	-0.2088	0.5233	8e-04
	(0.2005)	(0.2535)	(0.3778)	(0.2615)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity	0.029	-0.035	0.009	-0.005
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)
PRI stronghold	0.335*	-0.467^{**}	0.177	0.035
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.130)	(0.121)
High Mobilization	-0.115	-0.153	-0.580	-0.887^{***}
	(0.298)	(0.282)	(0.304)	(0.221)
PRD stronghold	-1.369^{***}	0.670	0.166	-0.772
	(0.401)	(0.550)	(0.307)	(0.506)
PAN stronghold	-0.081	0.221	-0.961^{**}	-0.909***
	(0.319)	(0.210)	(0.341)	(0.250)
PRI 2009	0.493***	-0.196^{***}	-0.140^{***}	0.067
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.038)
PRD 2009	0.009	0.292***	-0.129^{**}	0.087*
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.043)
PAN 2009	-0.012	-0.323***	0.559***	0.138***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.040)
Turnout 2009	0.069*	0.196***	0.139***	0.511***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Population Log	-0.306^{***} (0.068)	0.060 (0.059)	0.276*** (0.058)	0.048 (0.074)
Population over 18	-1.266 (1.129)	11.873*** (1.823)	-1.218 (1.278)	9.729*** (1.522)
Population over 65	1.686	-13.375^{***}	13.792***	-1.551
	(1.917)	(1.752)	(1.885)	(1.533)
Area	0.007*	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Density	0.00002*	0.0001**** (0.00001)	-0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
Indigenous	-2.736^{*} (1.348)	7.166*** (2.127)	-0.005 (1.246)	4.290* (1.867)
Catholic	4.265**	-3.290	0.181	1.771
	(1.303)	(1.834)	(0.858)	(1.051)
Nonreligious	-0.653	-7.192**	5.084**	-2.540
	(2.275)	(2.710)	(1.569)	(2.109)
Education	0.194	-0.190	0.222*	0.051
	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.091)	(0.070)
College degree	-8.088^{***}	18.192***	-0.219	11.626***
	(1.496)	(1.700)	(1.296)	(1.253)
Illiteracy	-4.085	-8.844^{**}	4.424	-6.737*
	(3.100)	(3.034)	(2.977)	(3.056)
Inhabitants per house	0.152	0.967***	-0.398	0.963***
	(0.188)	(0.222)	(0.215)	(0.214)
Population in the labor market	-3.399*	-14.010^{***}	7.792***	-11.285^{***}
	(1.697)	(1.806)	(1.603)	(1.826)
Female population in the labor market	0.260	10.223***	-5.853***	5.785***
	(1.452)	(1.530)	(1.437)	(1.475)
No insurance	-2.538^{**}	-0.801	0.286	-3.427^{***}
	(0.782)	(0.718)	(0.729)	(0.743)
Female head of household	-0.900	0.481	-2.489^{***}	-2.569^{***}
	(0.723)	(0.688)	(0.693)	(0.763)
Inhabitants per room	-0.223	1.742***	0.809	2.224***
	(0.542)	(0.485)	(0.527)	(0.554)
Dirt floor	-1.555(1.376)	-1.206 (1.604)	1.167 (1.531)	-1.468(1.313)
All services	0.028	0.690	-0.905** (0.341)	-0.228 (0.401)
No services	1.863	-7.576	3.075	-2.408
	(4.987)	(4.542)	(3.096)	(3.939)

Table F.6: Effects of the Location of *Soriana* stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election. Precincts outside Mexico City and the State of Mexico.

(0.817) (0.799) (0.907) (0.728) Mobile phone -1.284 (0.746) -2.657*** (0.779) 0.686 (0.612) -3.154*** (0.623) Internet -1.253 (0.961) -5.818*** (1.057) 9.183*** (1.023) 1.067 (0.820) Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158* (0.071) -0.173* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253* (0.123) (0.142) (0.168) -0.004 (0.134) PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055** (0.288) 0.299 (0.446) 0.132 (0.168) -0.046 (0.134) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904** (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.326) -0.795** (0.285) 1.009* (0.448) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* (0.442) -0.134 (0.377) -0.358 (0.488) -0.139 (0.222)	ar	1.436	1.701*	0.264	3.116***
Mobile phone -1.284 (0.746) -2.657^{***} (0.779) 0.686 (0.612) -3.154^{***} (0.623)Internet -1.253 (0.961) -5.818^{***} (1.057) 9.183^{***} (1.023) 1.067 (0.820)Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158^* (0.071) -0.173^* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049)Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.142) 0.132 (0.168) -0.004 (0.134)PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055^{**} (0.388) 0.299 (0.408) 1.237^{**} (0.446) 0.453 (0.310)Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (1.104) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372)High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004)Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.609 (0.442) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.408) -0.239 (0.266)High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306)Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* (0.442) -0.134 (0.377) -0.358 (0.318) -0.139 (0.306)		(0.817)	(0.799)	(0.907)	(0.728)
Internet (0.746) (0.779) (0.612) (0.623) Internet -1.253 (0.961) -5.818^{***} (1.057) 9.183^{***} (1.023) 1.067 (0.820) Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158^* (0.071) -0.173^* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.142) 0.132 (0.168) -0.004 (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.388) 0.118 (0.442) 0.132 (0.446) -0.004 (0.310) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.511) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.474) -0.239 (0.366) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) -0.358 (0.377) -0.358 (0.474) -0.329 (0.328)	Aobile phone	-1.284	-2.657***	0.686	-3.154***
Internet -1.253 (0.961) -5.818^{***} (1.057) 9.183^{***} (1.023) 1.067 (0.820)Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158^* (0.071) -0.173^* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049)Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.142) 0.132 (0.168) -0.004 (0.134)PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055^{**} (0.388) 0.299 (0.408) 1.237^{**} (0.446) 0.453 (0.310)Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372)High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (0.326) -2.904^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.408) -0.239 (0.266)High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.422) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.467) 0.467 (0.306)Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306)High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.354^* (0.456) -0.134 (0.377) -0.358 (0.488) -0.139 (0.306)	1	(0.746)	(0.779)	(0.612)	(0.623)
(0.961) (1.057) (1.023) (0.820) Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158^* (0.071) -0.173^* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.123) 0.132 (0.142) -0.004 (0.168) PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.388) 0.118 (0.408) 0.132 (0.446) 0.453 (0.310) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.3377) 1.009^* (0.474) -0.239 (0.306) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* (0.456) -0.134 (0.152) -0.358 (0.474) -0.139 (0.377)	nternet	-1.253	-5.818***	9.183***	1.067
Proximity × PRI Stronghold -0.053 (0.045) 0.158^* (0.071) -0.173^* (0.068) -0.046 (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.142) 0.132 (0.168) -0.004 (0.134) PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055^{**} (0.388) 0.299 (0.408) 1.237^{**} (0.446) 0.453 (0.310) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.609 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.4408) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* (0.456) -0.134 (0.156) -0.358 (0.427) -0.358 (0.427) -0.358 (0.306)		(0.961)	(1.057)	(1.023)	(0.820)
Interfact (0.045) (0.071) (0.068) (0.049) Proximity × High Mobilization -0.253^* (0.123) 0.118 (0.142) 0.132 (0.168) -0.004 (0.134) PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055^{**} (0.388) 0.299 (0.408) 1.237^{**} (0.446) 0.453 (0.310) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.609 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.408) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* (0.156) -0.134 (0.192) -0.358 (0.318) -0.139 (0.222)	roximity $ imes$ PRI Stronghold	-0.053	0.158*	-0.173^{*}	-0.046
Proximity × High Mobilization $-0.253^{*}_{(0.123)}$ $0.118_{(0.142)}$ $0.132_{(0.168)}$ $-0.004_{(0.134)}$ PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization $-1.055^{**}_{(0.388)}$ $0.299_{(0.408)}$ $1.237^{**}_{(0.446)}$ $0.453_{(0.310)}$ Proximity × PRD Stronghold $0.211_{(0.504)}$ $-0.934^{*}_{(0.424)}$ $0.154_{(0.151)}$ $-0.367_{(0.372)}$ High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold $0.609_{(1.266)}$ $-2.904^{**}_{(1.104)}$ $1.394_{(0.775)}$ $-1.168_{(1.004)}$ Proximity × PAN Stronghold $-0.291_{(0.326)}$ $-0.795^{**}_{(0.285)}$ $1.009^{*}_{(0.408)}$ $-0.239_{(0.266)}$ High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold $0.199_{(0.442)}$ $0.091_{(0.377)}$ $0.310_{(0.474)}$ $0.366_{(0.306)}$ Proximity × PRI Stronghold $0.354^{*}_{*}_{*}$ $-0.134_{(0.152)}$ $-0.358_{(0.438)}$ $-0.139_{(0.221)}$		(0.045)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.049)
Image: Normal Stronghold x High Mobilization (0.123) (0.142) (0.168) (0.134) PRI Stronghold x High Mobilization -1.055^{**} 0.299 1.237^{**} 0.453 Proximity x PRD Stronghold 0.211 -0.934^{*} 0.154 -0.367 Proximity x PRD Stronghold 0.211 -0.934^{*} 0.154 -0.367 High Mobilization x PRD Stronghold 0.609 -2.904^{**} 1.394 -1.168 Proximity x PAN Stronghold 0.609 -0.291 (0.775) (1.004) Proximity x PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.285) (0.408) (0.266) High Mobilization x PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.377) (0.474) (0.306) Proximity x PRI Stronghold 0.354^{*} -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Proximity x PRI Stronghold 0.354^{*} -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Proximity x PRI Stronghold 0.354^{*} -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Proximity x PRI Stronghold 0.254^{*} -0.134 -0.358 -0.139	roximity \times High Mobilization	-0.253*	0.118	0.132	-0.004
PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization -1.055^{**} 0.299 1.237^{**} 0.453 Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 -0.934^* 0.154 -0.367 High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 -2.904^{**} 1.394 -1.168 Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.609 -2.904^{**} 1.394 -1.168 Proximity × PAN Stronghold 0.609 -0.795^{**} 1.009^* -0.239 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 0.091 0.310 0.467 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.354^* -0.134 -0.358 0.299 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139	, ,	(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.168)	(0.134)
(0.388) (0.408) (0.446) (0.310) Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 (0.504) -0.934^* (0.424) 0.154 (0.151) -0.367 (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904^{**} (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^* (0.408) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 	'RI Stronghold $ imes$ High Mobilization	n —1.055**	0.299	1.237**	0.453
Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.211 -0.934^* 0.154 -0.367 High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 -2.904^{**} 1.394 -1.168 Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 -0.795^{**} 1.009^* -0.239 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold -0.291 -0.795^{**} 1.009^* -0.239 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 0.091 0.310 0.467 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139	0 0	(0.388)	(0.408)	(0.446)	(0.310)
(0.504) (0.424) (0.151) (0.372) High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 (1.266) -2.904** (1.104) 1.394 (0.775) -1.168 (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 (0.326) -0.795** (0.285) 1.009* (0.408) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold × High Mobilization 0.354* (0.156) -0.134 (0.192) -0.358 (0.318) -0.139 (0.322)	roximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.211	-0.934^{*}	0.154	-0.367
High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold 0.609 -2.904** 1.394 -1.168 Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 -0.795** 1.009* -0.239 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 0.091 0.310 0.467 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 Y High Mobilization 0.156 0.150 0.192 0.192 0.310 0.467		(0.504)	(0.424)	(0.151)	(0.372)
(1.266) (1.104) (0.775) (1.004) Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 -0.795** 1.009* -0.239 High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 0.091 0.310 0.467 Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 × High Mobilization 0.156) 0.192 0.0318 0.222	figh Mobilization $ imes$ PRD Stronghold	ld 0.609	-2.904**	1.394	-1.168
Proximity × PAN Stronghold -0.291 (0.326) -0.795^{**} (0.285) 1.009^{*} (0.408) -0.239 (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 (0.442) 0.091 (0.377) 0.310 (0.474) 0.467 (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354^{*} (0.156) -0.134 (0.192) -0.358 (0.318) -0.139 (0.222)		(1.266)	(1.104)	(0.775)	(1.004)
Image: Non-Stronghold (0.326) (0.285) (0.408) (0.266) High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold 0.199 0.091 0.310 0.467 (0.422) (0.377) (0.474) (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 × High Mobilization (0.156) (0.192) (0.318) (0.222)	roximity \times PAN Stronghold	-0.291	-0.795**	1.009*	-0.239
High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold0.199 (0.442)0.091 (0.377)0.310 (0.474)0.467 (0.306)Proximity × PRI Stronghold0.354* (0.156)-0.134 (0.192)-0.358 (0.318)-0.139 (0.222)		(0.326)	(0.285)	(0.408)	(0.266)
0 (0.442) (0.377) (0.474) (0.306) Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 × High Mobilization (0.156) (0.192) (0.318) (0.222)	High Mobilization $ imes$ PAN Stronghold	ld 0.199	0.091	0.310	0.467
Proximity × PRI Stronghold 0.354* -0.134 -0.358 -0.139 × High Mobilization (0.156) (0.192) (0.318) (0.222)		(0.442)	(0.377)	(0.474)	(0.306)
× High Mobilization (0.156) (0.192) (0.318) (0.222)	roximity $ imes$ PRI Stronghold	0.354*	-0.134	-0.358	-0.139
	< High Mobilization	(0.156)	(0.192)	(0.318)	(0.222)
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold 0.351 1.109 -1.113 0.395	Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	0.351	1.109	-1.113	0.395
× High Mobilization (0.630) (0.754) (0.655) (0.516)	< High Mobilization	(0.630)	(0.754)	(0.655)	(0.516)
Proximity × PRD Stronghold 0.282 0.504 −0.627 0.249	Proximity $ imes$ PRD Stronghold	0.282	0.504	-0.627	0.249
× High Mobilization (0.371) (0.311) (0.473) (0.294)	< High Mobilization	(0.371)	(0.311)	(0.473)	(0.294)
Constant 16.674*** 1.162 -2.425 20.861***	Constant	16.674***	1.162	-2.425	20.861***
(1.989) (2.312) (1.724) (2.251)		(1.989)	(2.312)	(1.724)	(2.251)
Municipal dummies \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark \checkmark	/unicipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
N 27,205 27,205 27,205 27,205	$\frac{1}{2}$	27,205	27,205	27,205	27,205
K ⁻ 0.690 0.862 0.860 0.843	1. 1. 1. P ²	0.690	0.862	0.860	0.843
Adjusted K ⁻ 0.682 0.858 0.85/ 0.859	2 (1(COT)	0.682	0.858	0.857	0.839
<u>X</u> (ar = 697) 31,868.890 31,868.890 55,784.530 55,580.000 50,437.860 50,437.860	((ar = 09/)	31,868.890	53,/84.530	53,580.000	50,437.860

* Significant at the 0.1 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. *Significant at the 5 percent level.

Table F.7: Marginal Effects of Proximity to *Wal Mart* on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election.

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI Stronghold	0.100	-0.080	-0.193	-0.371
-	(0.196)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.202)
PRD Stronghold	3.671	-2.366	1.359	3.098
U	(2.273)	(3.041)	(1.327)	(2.577)
PAN Stronghold	-0.730	-1.517	2.125	-0.283
	(0.624)	(1.472)	(1.076)	(0.915)

	Peña Nieto vote share	López Obrador vote share	Vázquez Mota vote share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity	-0.007	0.009	0.001	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.028)
PRI stronghold	-0.226	-0.755**	0.378*	-0.645^{***}
	(0.260)	(0.236)	(0.172)	(0.190)
High Mobilization	-0.367	-0.281	0.425	-0.271
	(0.440)	(0.363)	(0.370)	(0.229)
PRD stronghold	0.244	-0.968^{***}	0.029	-0.779^{***}
	(0.423)	(0.279)	(0.154)	(0.221)
PAN stronghold	-6.404^{***}	2.349**	3.075***	-1.550^{**}
	(1.116)	(0.814)	(0.698)	(0.566)
PRI 2009	-0.361^{***} (0.066)	0.619*** (0.041)	-0.158^{***} (0.045)	0.070 (0.068)
PRD2009	0.405*** (0.075)	-0.073^{*} (0.035)	-0.138^{***} (0.036)	0.154*
PAN2009	-0.491^{***} (0.085)	0.092*	0.480*** (0.051)	0.053
Turnout 2009	0.279*** (0.070)	-0.022 (0.031)	0.067*	0.373***
Population Log	0.129	-0.172	0.044	-0.003
Population over 18	(0.142) 14.751*** (2.872)	2.404	-8.053^{***}	9.627***
Population over 65	-21.147***	8.884*** (2.460)	20.115***	(1.800) 7.462*
Area	(4.027)	(2.469) 0.065***	(3.148)	(3.581)
Density	(0.020)	-0.00000	(0.009)	0.00001
Indigenous	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00001)
	-6.042	-4.227	2.537	-8.623**
Catholic	(3.867)	(4.038)	(2.089)	(3.202)
	1.667		0.874	0.718
Nonreligious	(2.484)	(2.471) 	(0.850)	(0.888)
River and a second se	(3.345)	(4.221)	(2.593)	(2.332)
Education	-1.802***	0.391*	0.812**	-0.767***
	(0.302)	(0.195)	(0.286)	(0.224)
College degree	29.896***	-9.110^{***}	-3.240	19.365***
	(3.236)	(1.835)	(2.348)	(2.556)
Illiteracy	-18.509***	2.448	9.727	-5.672
	(5.184)	(5.706)	(4.991)	(3.879)
Inhabitants per house	1.508 ^{**}	1.290**	-1.039^{**}	1.852***
	(0.542)	(0.392)	(0.346)	(0.344)
Population in the labor market	-13.891^{**} (4.554)	2.994 (2.080)	8.049** (2.655)	-2.943 (2.801)
Female population in the labor market	9.779** (3.609)	-0.446 (2.136)	-4.844* (2.363)	4.782* (2.174)
No insurance	-0.201	0.917	-1.261	-0.632
	(1.566)	(0.937)	(0.844)	(0.910)
Female head of household	-1.198	3.746***	-3.407***	-0.719
	(1.478)	(1.087)	(0.762)	(0.845)
Inhabitants per room	1.047	-1.777^{*}	0.564	-0.141
	(1.185)	(0.835)	(0.549)	(0.722)
Dirt floor	-2.639	-1.893	3.829*	-0.121
	(2.451)	(2.571)	(1.889)	(1.547)
All services	1.139	-0.970 (0,700)	0.025	0.350
No services	4.270	-3.906	9.324**	10.127*
	(5.441)	(4.236)	(2.850)	(4.807)

Table F.8: Effects of the Proximity to WalMart stores on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election.

Car	-0.321	-0.452	3.791***	2.702**	
	(1.346)	(0.926)	(0.848)	(0.831)	
34.111 1	1 400	0.017	0.750	0.001	
Mobile phone	-1.408	-0.017	-0.752	-2.031	
	(1.746)	(0.986)	(0.937)	(1.490)	
Internet	-6.986^{***}	2.082*	8.074***	2.385*	
	(1.330)	(1.044)	(1.151)	(1.201)	
		. ,		. ,	
Proximity × PRI Stronghold	0.073	0.003	-0.014	0.056	
	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.047)	
Provimity × High Mobilization	0.412	-0.333	-0.322	-0 344	
	(0.370)	(0.262)	(0.232)	(0.184)	
	(0.01.0)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(01-0-)	
PRI Stronghold \times High Mobilization	1.171*	-0.515	0.639	1.294***	
	(0.460)	(0.464)	(0.351)	(0.346)	
Provimity × PPD Stronghold	0.202	0.141	0.022	0.028	
1 Toxining × 1 KD Stronghold	(0.202	(0.094)	(0.022	(0.150)	
	(0.240)	(0.0)4)	(0.000)	(0.150)	
High Mobilization × PRD Stronghold	-4.646^{***}	2.526**	1.106	-0.871	
0 0	(1.268)	(0.965)	(0.740)	(1.367)	
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	1.489	-1.544*	0.163	0.216	
	(0.813)	(0.783)	(0.349)	(0.389)	
High Mobilization × PAN Stronghold	8.328***	-2.359	-4.230^{*}	1.853	
888	(1.668)	(1.536)	(1.935)	(1.475)	
	. ,	. ,			
Proximity \times PRI Stronghold	-0.558	0.221	0.141	-0.090	
× High Mobilization	(0.353)	(0.325)	(0.244)	(0.238)	
Proximity \times PRD Stronghold	-2.569	3.854	1.658	3.473	
× High Mobilization	(3.212)	(2.332)	(1.425)	(2.626)	
0				· · /	
Proximity \times PAN Stronghold	-3.412^{*}	1.138	2.283	-0.162	
× High Mobilization	(1.642)	(1.017)	(1.332)	(0.977)	
Constant	10.351	15 721***	2 985	31 122***	
Constant	(7.751)	(4.174)	(2.858)	(4.593)	
Municipal dummies	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	
N	10,567	10,567	10,567	10,567	
\mathbb{R}^2	0.873	0.866	0.910	0.811	
F-Statistic (df = 147)	494.1***	463.7***	730.2***	308.5***	
Notes:		***Significant at the 0.1 percent level.			

* Significant at the 0.1 percent level.
 **Significant at the 1 percent level.
 *Significant at the 5 percent level.